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The Enduring Ambiguities of Antitrust Liability for
Worker Collective Action
Sanjukta M. Paul*
This Article examines the regulation, by antitrust law, of collective
action by low-wage workers who are classified as independent
contractors, and who therefore presumptively do not receive the benefit
of the labor exemption from antitrust law. Such workers find
themselves in the position of most workers prior to the New Deal: at
once lacking labor protections, yet exposed to antitrust liability for
organizing to improve their conditions. I argue that this default rule is
the legacy of a problematic history that is taken for granted by the
contemporary antitrust framework.
In Part I, I show that the threat of antitrust liability is a powerful
constraint upon contemporary independent contractor workers’ own
ability to take action to address their working conditions. In Part II, I
trace the application of antitrust liability to worker collective action to
the time before the labor exemption, arguing that pre-New Deal courts
imported fundamentally hierarchical and coercive tenets from the
common-law tradition into the fledgling antitrust law in order to apply
it to contain worker organizing, thereby creating tensions with their
own freedom of contract principles. In Part III, I show how the legal
framework of the labor exemption reinforced the underlying assumption
that antitrust regulates worker collective action, even as it immunized
most workers from such liability (so long as they continued to be
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considered employees). In Part IV, I argue that the modern framework
for antitrust does not compel the continued application of this default
rule, and indeed supplies materials for a fresh, more balanced
reconsideration of it.
Ultimately, the situation of these workers is a test of what antitrust
fundamentally says about labor, absent a specific exemption. Because
that exemption is currently rooted in the New Deal network of labor
regulation, antitrust’s treatment of labor becomes a baseline for critical
conversations about how to reform our current framework of labor
regulation—in the same way that it was the baseline for those
conversations prior to the New Deal itself. In particular, antitrust
functions as an outer limit for any such reform, and also for specific
policy proposals to address the increasing prevalence of working
relationships outside the bounds of employment.
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INTRODUCTION
In the winter of 1999, following a series of strikes at America’s ports
aimed at improving poor working conditions and low pay, a number of
individual truck drivers found themselves served with subpoenas by the
U.S. Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”), which was investigating their
potential participation in a price-fixing conspiracy.1 These men, who
were working punishing hours yet hardly breaking even, were
grassroots leaders in an episode of collective action among low-wage
workers that was somewhat unusual for the period. Their participation
and leadership in these expressions of solidarity was the basis for the
investigation.

1. See infra Part I.B (discussing antitrust as a barrier to worker collective action).
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In this Article, I examine the origins of the rule that antitrust law
largely prohibits collective action by workers who fall outside the
bounds of employment, and who therefore presumptively do not receive
the benefit of the labor exemption from antitrust law.2 The threat that
organizing for decent wages and working conditions will be prosecuted
as price-fixing is a powerful constraint upon such workers’ ability to
take action to change their circumstances. Antitrust has historically
structured the nature and content of labor regulation in this country,
and it is currently poised to do so again in a new form. It did so
directly and punitively in the Gilded Age. It did so indirectly and
somewhat under the surface during the New Deal era. In today’s
deregulation era, it is of increasing significance in regulating workers
who fall outside the bounds of the National Labor Relations Act
(“NLRA”)3 (and other employment and labor law), as a limit upon
new forms of labor regulation that would bring these nontraditional
workers within their scope, and as a potential baseline for labor law
reform generally. In contrast to the neoclassical interpretation of
antitrust, which holds that the doctrine is justified on economic
grounds independent of politics and moral norms, I adopt the
perspective that antitrust has essential and irreducible political or
normative content.
While the neoclassical interpretation has
certainly been challenged, it still holds great sway as the official
position of most courts and the mainstream of antitrust scholarship.
Antitrust’s normative content can specifically be seen in its
relationship to labor, which has changed over time according to the
specific policy project and broader norms that held purchase among
decision makers.
Antitrust law had its origins in a republican outlook that viewed
emerging concentrations of economic and political power, enabled
by the rise of the modern business corporation, as highly
problematic. The statute was not, originally, intended to apply to
workers’ or farmers’ collective action. The policy project envisioned
by the legislators—breaking up concentrations of economic power—
would in fact be undermined by preventing cooperation among lesspowerful economic actors who were affected by large business
combinations.4

2. See infra Part III.C.2.
3. National Labor Relations Act of 1935, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2012)).
4. See infra Part II.B (discussing the Sherman Act and its relationship to labor).
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This original orientation took a sharp turn in the courts, where a
different and somewhat competing policy project, that of building the
national market society, held greater sway. That project benefited
from a compliant and reliable workforce. In order to use antitrust to
prevent and punish worker organizing, Gilded Age courts made use
of an equivocation in the concept of “free trade,” and drew on
fundamentally hierarchical and coercive assumptions regarding workers
from the common law of labor regulation.5 In purporting to implement
parity between capital and labor under antitrust regulation, the courts
actually relied upon status-based normative assumptions regarding
workers qua workers.6
These courts succeeded in making the presumptive illicitness of
worker collective action the underlying, default position, against which
the “labor exemption” to antitrust law would then be defined in the New
Deal era.7 The law of the labor exemption in fact reified the
classicists’ application of antitrust to worker collective action. It also
temporarily held the rule at bay, in service of the new policy project
of the New Deal economy, which involved economic co-governance
by business, the state, and organized labor. Meanwhile, antitrust
began to consolidate into its contemporary neoclassical economic
form, disavowing direct consideration of social or moral norms and
emphasizing economic efficiency.
As evidenced by
contemporaneous policy commentary, the labor exemption was
viewed by extreme neoclassicists as an unjustified instance of special
treatment of labor, a deviation from scientific economic principles.
The deregulation era beginning roughly in the late 1970s began to
expose a growing number of workers to antitrust liability, in a
reprisal of the Gilded Age version of the antitrust-labor intersection.
The body of law—roughly, the neoclassical interpretation of pricefixing—that tentatively comes to apply to these workers, prizes
economic efficiency, disavows the social effects (and often even the
economic effects) of its antitrust decisions, and certainly disavows
moral considerations. To the extent that moral considerations
applicable to collective action (such as liberty interests in freedom of
association and expression) are enshrined in other areas of law such
as the First Amendment, it also keeps those at bay by insisting upon
an over-solid distinction between the “economic” and “political”
5. See infra Part II.C.3 (discussing early decisions applying the Sherman Act to workers).
6. See id.
7. See infra Part III (discussing the labor exemption).
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spheres (precisely the distinction called into question by—among
other things—the history of antitrust’s changing application to
labor).
Yet, although neoclassical price-fixing law officially
disavows moral and social considerations, it in fact relies upon such
“extrinsic” considerations in many respects, often tacitly folded into
invocations of “legitimate” competition,8 and it certainly does so in
its relationship to worker collective action.9 Because how antitrust is
to treat labor is, and always has been, a contingent policy decision
involving irreducible normative content, I argue that the rule ought to
be revisited in light of the specific moral, political, and economic
concerns raised by worker collective action in pursuit of a decent
livelihood.
The literature has not previously addressed the development of this
rule and its conceptual underpinnings through the various relevant areas
of law and eras, although naturally many existing areas of scholarship
bear upon the account. The issue of antitrust liability and contemporary
independent contractor workers has been flagged in the literature on
contingent work, but has not been squarely addressed there.10 In its
contemporary form, it has been addressed somewhat more squarely by
scholars focused on trade, that is, antitrust law and market regulation,
particularly as to specific trades or industries.11 Some relatively recent
work in antitrust economics argues that collective action on the part of
certain smaller market actors, including small businesses and
independent contractors, ought to be permitted;12 other work in this area
sets out the concept of ruinous competition, which may also have
8. See infra Part IV.A (exploring the normative content of the price-fixing case law).
9. I specifically argue, in Part IV.B, infra, that antitrust imports “extrinsic” normative
considerations in the price-fixing doctrine generally, in the operation of what I call the
professional privilege, and in the application of, or refusal to apply, First Amendment protection
to worker collective action that is not otherwise protected by the labor exemption.
10. See, e.g., Elizabeth Kennedy, Comment, Freedom from Independence: Collective
Bargaining Rights for “Dependent Contractors,” 26 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 143 (2005)
(noting potential antitrust liability for collective action by independent contractors).
11. The collective economic action of independent contractor physicians in particular has
received scholarly attention; the situation is something of a special case, given the complex
regulatory structure within which it exists (which may itself create cartel-like benefits). Elizabeth
M. Devine, Physical Unionization: A Prescription for Modern Managed Care, 4 QUINNIPIAC
HEALTH L.J. 39, 40 (2000).
12. See Warren S. Grimes, The Sherman Act’s Unintended Bias Against Lilliputians: Small
Players’ Collective Action as a Counter to Relational Market Power, 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 195, 234
(2001) (proposing a limited countervailing power defense for small players’ collective action).
This argument relies upon a conception of market power whose status in the price-fixing doctrine
is currently somewhat tenuous, but which has the potential to be revived, as further explored in
Part IV.B.1, infra, and Part IV.B.3, infra.
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application to independent contractor workers.13 I bring these insights
together with historical considerations regarding the development of
both antitrust and pre-New Deal labor regulation.
The bulk of the literature on antitrust and labor generally, meanwhile,
dates from during or shortly following the mid-century “normal
science” period of the labor exemption,14 and is largely defined by its
assumptions. In particular, much of this literature is built, either
expressly or indirectly, upon assumptions regarding labor unions’ size
and strength (and relatedly, upon the economic significance of
collective bargaining), which no longer hold.15 As a result, the
literature is to a great extent focused upon collective bargaining policy
and its antitrust implications, rather than upon unilateral worker
collective action, and even the collective bargaining discussions tend to
be conditioned by the assumption of labor union size and strength.16
How antitrust will regulate unilateral worker collective action in the
context of contingent work is an especially pressing topic, given its
uncertain legal status, its increasing significance in the labor market,17
and the significant constraints it is already placing upon these workers
and their movements.18 This problem cannot be obviated by resolving
the “misclassification” issue, familiar from labor and employment law,
alone.19

13. See, e.g., KEITH N. HYLTON, ANTITRUST LAW: ECONOMIC THEORY & COMMON LAW
EVOLUTION 94–98 (2003) (comparing the concept of “ruinous competition” between the
Sherman Act and common law); Mark Grady, Toward a Positive Economic Theory of Antitrust,
30 ECON. INQUIRY 225 (1992) (discussing the concept of “ruinous competition”).
14. See infra Part III.C (discussing the “normal science” of the labor exception).
15. See Ralph K. Winter, Collective Bargaining and Competition: The Application of Antitrust
Standards to Union Activities, 73 YALE L.J. 14, 16 (1963) (“[U]nions are far more powerful and
strategically entrenched today than at the time of Loewe v. Lawlor, and collective bargaining is a
significant force shaping the economy.”); see also Randall Marks, Labor and Antitrust: Striking a
Balance without Balancing, 35 AM. U. L. REV. 699, 701 (1986) (arguing that antitrust does not
sufficiently constrain labor). Marks almost exclusively assumes the actions of established labor
unions, considers unilateral activity only cursorily, and states “the nonstatutory exemption,”
which covers collective bargaining, “is most frequently at issue in labor/antitrust cases.” Id.
Even commentators expressing concern about the diminishing reach of the labor exemption tend
to operate on this assumption, concerning themselves primarily with specific doctrinal borderfixing issues. Milton Handler & William C. Zifchak, Collective Bargaining and the Antitrust
Law: The Emasculation of the Labor Exemption, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 459, 460 (1981).
16. Winter, supra note 15; Marks, supra note 15; Handler & Zifchak, supra note 15; see also
Elinor Hoffman, Labor and Antitrust Policy: Drawing a Line of Demarcation, 50 BROOK. L.
REV. 1 (1983) (analyzing labor and antitrust policy).
17. See infra Part I.C (discussing potential defendants).
18. See infra Part I.B (discussing antitrust as a barrier to worker collective action).
19. See infra Part I.D (discussing the intersection between labor and employment law).
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But the implications of the question are not limited to contingent
workers. The situation of these workers is a test of what antitrust
fundamentally says about labor, absent a specific exemption. That
exemption is currently rooted in the network of affirmative labor
legislation. As the functioning of that affirmative framework arguably
declines and as discussion of modifying it or replacing it increases,
antitrust’s treatment of labor may again become the baseline for those
critical conversations—in the same way that it was prior to the New
Deal itself, when avoiding antitrust’s grasp was one of the main aims of
the labor movement.20 The specific assumption that workers’ right to
organize for economic betterment is an “exemption” to be bargained
for, perhaps by giving up other things, has implications far beyond
independent contractor workers.
I. THE IMPACT OF ANTITRUST ON CONTEMPORARY INDEPENDENT
CONTRACTOR WORKERS
In today’s post-New Deal, “deregulation economy,”21 workers are
often and increasingly relegated to labor relationships outside formal
employment. Collective action by workers who are classified as
independent contractors, and who therefore presumptively do not
receive the benefit of the labor exemption from antitrust law, may in
theory, and has in scattered instances, drawn antitrust scrutiny. As truck
drivers, taxi drivers, home health care workers, artists, and others
choose to organize in an effort to improve poor pay and working
conditions, we may expect to see this issue addressed in the courts if
and when one of these movements gains real power. Regardless, the
threat of antitrust liability already exercises profound constraints on
these workers’ ability to organize. Finally, as policy makers and
advocates consider new schemes to organize and regulate work that
falls outside the bounds of employment, antitrust may function as a
limit on the regulatory possibilities (particularly in cases of local
initiatives).
20. The labor movement’s primary aim, more precisely, was avoiding the judiciary’s
repression of worker collective action generally, whether accomplished by antitrust or by other
bases for issuing injunctions in particular. WILLIAM FORBATH, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF THE
AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT 128–66 (1991). However, very few of those other bases, many
of them explicitly rooted in the older common-law tradition of worker regulation (described in
Part II.A.2, infra), have survived to the present day, while antitrust has.
21. I adopt this term to describe the economic policy paradigm that began to replace the New
Deal framework starting in roughly the late 1970s. I adopt the term for ease of reference,
although this set of policies is often characterized not only by the withdrawal of certain types of
regulation but by the extension of other sorts of regulation, often aimed at workers.
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A. The Struggle for Decent Work and Decent Pay as Price-Fixing
The labor exemption currently immunizes most worker collective
action from antitrust liability. Employee status, much discussed in its
impact on workers in terms of the receding reach of labor and
employment law protections, is also the trigger for extending the grasp
of antitrust regulation of workers’ autonomous collective action to
better their working conditions. In other words, a phenomenon that is
commonly understood as exemplifying deregulation actually extends
regulation over the conduct of workers even as it withdraws it from the
conduct of employers. As a result, individual workers classified as
independent contractors may be subject to antitrust prosecution for
organizing for decent wages or working conditions under the pricefixing doctrine, regardless of the reasonableness of the wage or the
broader social or economic outcome.
Assuming for the moment that the labor exemption does not apply to
a given set of independent contractor workers, and that they are not able
to prove that they are misclassified employees, the law of price-fixing is
likely to govern their concerted action. The modern neoclassical
interpretation of antitrust, which mostly still reigns, takes market actors
as black boxes: they are just “firms,” whether they are massive
corporations or a single truck driver.22
The relevant cases involving professional workers and “small
producers,” whose primary business is the selling of their services, are
the best predictor of how low-wage independent contractor workers
would be treated by antitrust law (and of how “professional”
independent contractor workers actually are treated). For the most part,
modern courts apply the law of price-fixing to hold that most collective
economic action by such actors, particularly if it is aimed at affecting
prices or other elements of the bargain and often even if it is not, is
illegal price-fixing, unless some specific exception applies.23 Neither
the reasonableness of the rate nor a net social or economic benefit
constitute exceptions.24

22. This was not the case in the formative, pre-New Deal period, as described in Part III, infra.
23. See, e.g., Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 423
(1990) (collective action by independent lawyers constituted price-fixing); Fed. Trade Comm’n v.
Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986) (collective action by independent dentists); Nat’l
Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978); Spence v. Se. Alaska Pilots’ Ass’n,
789 F. Supp. 1007, 1010 (D. Alaska 1990) (antitrust analysis involving association representing
independent contractor pilots).
24. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. at 423–24; Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs, 435
U.S. at 695.
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An especially apt illustration of this theory of liability is the Supreme
Court’s opinion in Federal Trade Commission v. Superior Court Trial
Lawyers Ass’n,25 both because it is a seminal case with respect to pricefixing generally, and because, of all the post-exemption antitrust cases
involving professional workers or small producers, it involves facts that
very closely resemble classic labor concerted action in which low- or
mid-wage independent contractors might engage. In the 1970s and 80s,
the District of Columbia had contracted the representation of indigent
defendants in the majority of criminal cases to a panel of private
attorneys and paid them only $30 per hour for in-court time and $25 per
hour for out-of-court time. The Superior Court Trial Lawyers
Association, whose membership was comprised of these panel
attorneys, initially tried to persuade the District to raise its members’
rates through political delegations and similar efforts. When those
efforts were unsuccessful, the attorneys decided they had no choice but
to take direct action. They formed a strike committee and agreed to
stop taking new panel work until the District agreed to their proposed
rate schedule. The strike went off with 90% participation, and the
District acceded to increased rates.26
The Federal Trade Commission filed a complaint against the
association, alleging an agreement in restraint of trade by “refusing to
compete for or accept new appointments under the CJA program[;] . . .
a conspiracy to fix prices and to conduct a boycott”; and engaging in
“unfair methods of competition.”27 Rejecting the administrative law
judge’s conclusion that the agreement among the lawyers had not
caused economic harm, the FTC decided that the agreement had been a
“coercive, concerted refusal to deal” and also caused harm (“substantial
anticompetitive effects”).28 Accordingly, it entered an order prohibiting
any future boycotts: it ordered the lawyers to desist from engaging in
any collective withholding of labor in an effort to improve their working
conditions. The court of appeal vacated the FTC’s cease-and-desist
order, holding that the expressive component of the boycott (discussed
further in Part IV, infra) warranted closer scrutiny, and in particular that
it required a consideration of whether the association possessed

25. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. at 423–24.
26. Id. at 416.
27. Id. at 418. Suit was brought under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, which
gives the agency the authority to bring litigation under the Sherman Act. Id. at 414 (citing
Federal Trade Commission Act, ch. 311, § 5, 38 Stat. 717, 719 (1914) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 45 (2012))).
28. Id. at 419–20.
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significant market power.29 The Supreme Court endorsed the court of
appeal’s analysis that the “respondents’ boycott constituted a classic
restraint of trade within the meaning of Section 1 of the Sherman Act,”
agreeing that “this constriction of supply is the essence of ‘price-fixing,’
whether it be accomplished by agreeing upon a price . . . or by agreeing
upon an output, which will increase the price offered.”30 It then insisted
that per se treatment was indeed appropriate, and that neither the
reasonableness of the price set nor lack of market power on the part of
small parties can save anticompetitive behavior from sanction.31 Within
the modern antitrust jurisprudence, Trial Lawyers is the case whose
facts most closely track the sort of worker collective action with which
this Article is concerned, and it also represents a certain rigid apex of
the Court’s neoclassical approach to price-fixing .32
Following Trial Lawyers and these general principles, a court
considering labor organizing activity—for example, a strike for higher
wages on the part of non-employee truck drivers, artists or art workers,
cab drivers, or even day laborers—may not only deny labor and
employment law protections to such workers, but may impose treble
damages or criminal penalties on the workers instead. Although the
issue has not been presented to an appellate court (or a trial court
making a decision of law), Trial Lawyers is a reasonable predictor of
how it may be decided by a court that chooses to double down on the
neoclassical approach rather than reconsider it.
B. An Object Lesson in the Revival of Antitrust as a Bar to Worker
Collective Action
The grassroots movement of port truck drivers in the deregulation
era, aimed at improving poor pay and working conditions, drew
significant antitrust scrutiny that in turn shaped that movement. This
example illustrates the significant obstacle antitrust poses to workers
classified as independent contractors who organize to improve their pay
and working conditions.
Deregulation-era trucking is characterized by what Michael Belzer
calls the labor market paradox: perennial shortages of skilled drivers,
coupled with rock-bottom wages and poor working conditions.33
29. Id. at 420.
30. Id. at 423.
31. Id. at 423–24; see also infra Part IV.B.3 (discussing the First Amendment aspects of the
Court’s analysis).
32. See infra Part IV.B.3 (discussing the First Amendment implications of antitrust law).
33. MICHAEL BELZER, SWEATSHOPS ON WHEELS: WINNERS AND LOSERS IN TRUCKING
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Deregulation economic policy has been the apparent cause.34 Returns
on equity in trucking, particularly in the truckload market,35 were not
high to begin with; post-deregulation, one might argue that they are
actually below cost in the economic sense.36 Employers thus often are
forced to cut wages below what they would like, and below what they
know is required to attract or keep skilled drivers. Drivers in the
truckload market, which includes port truck drivers, typically earn pay
in the minimum wage range and work extremely long hours. 37
Port truck drivers in the deregulation era began organizing, both
among themselves and in coordination with established labor
organizations, as early as the late 1980s, in response to the extremely
poor working conditions that ensued from deregulation of the trucking
industry. The following decade and a half were marked with numerous
DEREGULATION 151–54 (2000) (defining the labor market paradox).
34. Belzer’s description of the labor market effects of deregulation policy can be summarized
by saying that numerous established firms quickly went out of business, that many new (nonunion) firms entered the market, and that intense price competition forced wages lower and lower.
In the early 1980’s, in the wake of the Motor Carrier Act, around half of the Class I and Class II
general freight carriers, most of them union, went out of business. At the same time, many new
non-union carriers registered with the Department of Transportation. But these changes did not
happen evenly across the trucking industry. The market largely fractured along TL/LTL
(“truckload” and “less-than-truckload”) lines, which had not been its prior organizing principle.
Surviving firms in the general freight market—the prior biggest carriers—largely shed their TL
business, and grew hugely within the LTL sector, taking up the space left by smaller carriers that
had left the market. These firms included for example United Parcel Service (“UPS”), which
remained union and largely mid-wage. The general freight market consequently concentrated
five-fold. Meanwhile, the earlier peripheral TL-only market exploded, seeing the vast majority of
the new entrants while also seeing competition, particularly price competition, increase sharply.
Id. at 41–42.
35. The contrast is to the LTL market (e.g., the UPS and Federal Express (“FedEx”)). Id. at
202, 204.
36. Cf. id. at 202 (suggesting that post-deregulation trucking might be a perfect market in the
context of orthodox economic theory, in the sense that profits approach zero). However, it might
be more accurate to say that profits typically dip below zero when one considers them not in the
accounting sense (net of revenue and out-of-pocket costs), but in the economic sense (net of
revenue, out-of-pocket costs, and the opportunity cost of capital). HYLTON, supra note 13, at 94–
98 (2003). The latter would explain the transitoriness of many port trucking firms, and the niche
character of many that have any lasting power at all, enabled by idiosyncratic factors (e.g., special
deals, sometimes through family connections, with certain shippers; existence of other
operational arms that subsidize the port trucking operations; personal commitment of individual
owners or owning families who did well before deregulation). Id.
37. As of 2000, average real wages in trucking were back at late 1950’s levels. BELZER,
supra note 33, at 38. But this statistic belies the true decline, for unlike in the late 1950’s, when
the industry had not yet fractured into TL and LTL sectors and was more centralized, generally
speaking, the current market is characterized by very high wage differentials between these two
subsectors. Id. TL truck drivers, including port truck drivers, thus earn close to minimum wage,
if not less. Drivers as a rule also work extremely long hours, raising serious health and safety
issues. Id. at 152.
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strikes over issues relating to pay and working conditions, including but
not limited to: the failure to account, in pay rates, for spikes in fuel
prices; failure to compensate long periods of waiting at port terminals;
and numerous safety issues.38 The International Brotherhood of
Teamsters was intermittently involved in driver organizing during this
period, particularly in Los Angeles and Miami, but most of the
concerted action was led by independent drivers’ organizations.39
A number of these actions drew regulatory scrutiny and lawsuits.
The United Container Movers Association (“UCMA”) was a grassroots,
independent drivers’ association with some strength, at a minimum, in,
Baltimore, Charleston, Seattle, and Savannah. UCMA and its worker
leadership found itself as the target of a federal investigation by the
Clinton-era Federal Trade Commission, for price-fixing as a result of
their organizing toward a union and as a result of work stoppages over
low pay and long, uncompensated wait times at ports. The FTC went so
far as to serve several drivers, who stated that they were working “18
hours a day for less than the minimum wage just to make the payments
on our trucks and put food on the table” with subpoenas to testify as to
their role in a possible price-fixing conspiracy.40 Some time later, the
Support Trucking Group, another independent drivers’ association
based in Miami, engaged in concerted action over low wages,
equipment safety issues, and wait time. It, together with numerous
individual truck drivers, was hit with lawsuits from multiple entities,
including port terminal operators and Miami-Dade County itself.41

38. Interview with Jon Zerolnick, Research Dir., L.A. All. for a New Econ. (Aug. 22, 2014)
(interview notes on file with the author); Interview with Jon Zerolnick, Research Dir., L.A. All.
for a New Econ. (August 3, 2015) (interview notes on file with the author); see RUTH MILLIKEN,
L.A. STORY: IMMIGRANT WORKERS AND THE FUTURE OF THE U.S. LABOR MOVEMENT 178–84
(2006) (describing the grassroots, self-starting character of port truck driver organizing in the
1980’s and 1990’s).
39. MILLIKEN, supra note 38, 178–84; Interview with John Canham-Clyne, Former Dir., Ports
Campaign, Change to Win (May 28, 2014) (interview notes on file with the author); Interview
with Michael Manley, Staff Attorney, Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters (January 8, 2015) (interview notes
on file with the author).
40. Bill Mongelluzzo, Operators Seek to Organize, J. OF COM. (Dec. 1, 1999, 7:00 PM),
http://www.joc.com/operators-seek-organize_19991201.html; see also Rip Watson, Container
Haulers Seek to Unionize, J. OF COM. (Sept. 12, 1999, 8:00 PM), http://www.joc.com/containerhaulers-seek-unionize_19990912.html; Mark Gordon, Truckers Union Boss Ordered to Testify ,
FLA. TIMES UNION (Dec. 4, 1999), http://jacksonville.com/tu-online/stories/120499/bus_1E1FTC
__.html.
41. Complaint for Antitrust Violations at 1–2, Miami-Dade Cty. v. Support Trucking Grp.,
No. 04-cv-21687, 2004 WL 2868811 (S.D. Fla. 2004) (“This case arises out of a massive
conspiracy . . . with the purpose and effect of an attempt to monopolize, to fix prices and to
commit other unlawful practices designed to inflate the prices of trucking services provided by
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These actions, while they did not go to verdict or result in decisions
of law,42 profoundly shaped the course of organizing in this industry.
The constantly looming specter of antitrust liability powerfully
structured the strategy that port truck drivers pursued in their attempt to
improve their working conditions and to gain a collective voice in the
workplace—particularly once the drivers’ efforts were coordinated into
a comprehensive national campaign.43 The founding director of that
campaign observed: “[The threat of antitrust liability] was one of the
three or four major strategic factors in virtually everything that we did.
It was part of our checklist. The specter of antitrust liability has
significantly suppressed drivers’ ability to take collective action to
change their economic circumstances.”44 The counsel to the campaign
noted that the campaign was extremely cautious about worker collective
action on antitrust grounds in its early years, observing: “Apart from the
merits and whether damages were recovered, the sheer cost of
defending such an action would have been sufficient to shut the
campaign down.”45
More recently, when an independent group of port truck drivers in
Oakland, California engaged in an episode of collective action
(regarding pay rates, surcharges, and uncompensated wait time), their
attorney expressed his view that had the movement gained power, they
would be likely to face antitrust scrutiny. 46 One driver spoke of the
drivers’ aspiration to workers’ association regardless of employee
status,47 which antitrust might view as an illegal cartel.
non-union truckers for the movement of goods into and out of the Port of Miami.”); Port of
Miami Terminal Operating Co. v. Support Trucking, No. 04-cv-21703, 2004 WL 2868838 (S.D.
Fla. 2004); Antillean Marine Shipping Corp. v. Various Indep. Owners & Operators of Indep.
Trucking Cos., No. 04-cv-22530, 2004 WL 2875072 (S.D. Fla 2004); Universal Maritime Serv.
Corp. v. Support Trucking Grp., Nos. 04-cv-21687, 04-cv-21688, and 04-cv-21703, 2004 WL
2868849 (S.D. Fla. 2004).
42. While it is generally quite difficult to positively determine whether a settlement was
reached from docket records alone, a reasonable inference is that the prospect of defending such a
lawsuit, which individual low-income or middle-income defendants are not in a position to do,
prompted the result desired by plaintiffs in many of these cases: an end to the collective action,
and economic capitulation to the plaintiffs’ terms.
43. These efforts were largely consolidated into a nationally organized campaign when
Change to Win, a coalition of organizing-oriented labor unions, launched its port trucking
campaign in 2006. Interview with John Canham-Clyne, supra note 39.
44. Id.
45. Interview with Michael Manley, supra note 39.
46. Interview with Dan Siegel, Partner, Siegel & Yee (December 23, 2013) (interview notes
on file with the author).
47. Interview with Frank Adams, Port Truck Driver & Former Comm. Member, Port of
Oakland Truckers Ass’n (December 23, 2013) (interview notes on file with the author).
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Similarly, the threat of antitrust liability may be a formidable barrier
to concerted worker action to improve or change working conditions in
other industries with large concentrations of independent contractor
workers, including other sectors of the trucking industry. Some such
industries that have seen active organizing include taxi drivers, 48 and
home health care and child care providers.49 In both cases, there have
been hints of the antitrust law apparatus being deployed against worker
organizing, or hints that could it be so deployed. In the case of home
health care worker organizing, the FTC has in the past expressly taken a
position against a collective bargaining scheme for such workers, noting
that it would “require that private parties engage in conduct that
normally would be deemed per se violations of federal antitrust law,
including price fixing between competitors.”50 The threat can also be
glimpsed in lawsuits initiated in reaction to grassroots collective action
by workers outside formal organizing campaigns. A comprehensive
search of antitrust actions filed between 2000 and 2014 revealed
additional instances of actual litigation targeting collective action by
workers outside formal organizing campaigns, including grassroots
actions by low-paid truck drivers in other sub-sectors that were met with
antitrust prosecution.51
Anecdotal evidence—and a reasonable
48. Veena Dubal, Wage Slave or Entrepreneur?: Contesting the Dualism of Legal Worker
Identities (2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Loyola University Chicago School of
Law Journal); see also BIJU MATHEW, TAXI! CABS AND CAPITALISM IN NEW YORK CITY
(2008).
49. See Peggie R. Smith, The Publicization of Home-Based Care Work in State Labor Law, 92
MINN. L. REV. 1390, 1391 (2008) (noting the prevalence of the independent contractor form in
home health care work and describing active organizing among such workers); Peggie R. Smith,
Welfare, Child Care, and the People Who Care: Union Representation of Family Child Care
Providers, 55 U. KAN. L. REV. 321, 359 (2006) (noting that the recent successful organizing
efforts among such workers have been premised on the state action exemption to antitrust law,
where the state assumes the role of employer-of-record). The state action exemption, of course,
requires the political cooperation of a state entity together with an industry whose structure would
allow for such an approach.
50. FTC Staff Comment to the Hon. William J. Seitz Concerning Ohio Exec. Order No. 200723S to Establish Collective Bargaining for Home Health Care Workers (Feb. 14, 2008). This is
in line with the FTC’s general orientation toward health care providers, including doctors. In the
case of taxi drivers, while the FTC has not addressed worker organizing directly, it has taken an
active interest in the taxi industry generally that, given the agency’s general operating principles,
may have implications for worker organizing and in particular for any cooperative scheme that
resembles collective bargaining.
51. At a minimum, the actions involving workers pursuing concerted action, excluding
lawsuits against port truck drivers and driver associations, include: Complaint at 1–2, Siboney
Contracting Co. v. Owners Ass’n of Palm Beach & Broward Cty., No. 9:00-cv-08149-ASG (S.D.
Fla. 2000) (indicating that the plaintiff was a corporation that “act[ed] as a broker of rock and
aggregate materials for a variety of road and building projects, and . . . the [i]ndividual
[d]efendants are independent truck owner-operators who are members of the Association and
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inference based on the available evidence—suggests that there have
been additional threats to sue drawn by such scattered worker actions,
beyond what can be found in official court records. The seriousness of
the threat is intensified in cases of nontraditional organizing, because
some exceptions likely protect workers who are also seeking employee
status or who are organizing in concert with an established labor
organization that already has a sectoral presence representing
employees.52
C. Universe of Potential Defendants
Although difficult to measure with precision, independent contractor
workers have been estimated at somewhere between 6–7% of the
overall work force.53 The generally accepted view is that this
proportion is increasing.54 Independent contractors are spread widely in
the type of work they perform, the amounts they earn, and their
educational and class backgrounds. There are independent contractors
in almost every trade, including the professional trades, and also in
almost every type of manufacturing industry that allows for piecework.
For purposes of this Section, I refer to workers as independent
contractors when their employers classify them as such—putting aside
the question, for the moment, whether this would be the accurate legal
classification if tested.
We may view the workers we have in mind as comprising three
shades on a spectrum with imprecise and permeable borders. First,

believed to be leaders of the Association” and alleged a coordinated work stoppage aimed at a
15% pay rate increase due to a spike in fuel prices); Verified Complaint at 3, 10, Horizon Lines of
P.R., Inc. v. Asociacion de Camioneros de Arrastre de P.R., Inc., No. 3:05-cv-01801-PG (D.P.R.
2005) (alleging that an independent drivers’ association conducted a classic work stoppage to
increase rates); Verified Complaint at 1, 3, HN1 Therapy Network of P.R., LLC v. Asociacion
Puertoriquena de Fisioterapia, Inc., No. 03:10-cv-1404 (D.P.R. 2010) (identifying a classic group
boycott by physical therapists); Verified Complaint at 12, Humana Health Plans of P.R., Inc. v.
Juan L. Vilaro, No. 3:12-cv-1445 (D.P.R. 2012) (claiming concerted price-fixing and boycotting
by physicians). Numerous instances of lawsuits against small producers who may also be
considered workers are excluded from this list.
52. See infra Part II.C.2.b (describing legal arguments that may protect some organizing
among independent contractor workers from antitrust scrutiny).
53. Peter H. Cappelli & J.R. Keller, A Study of the Extent and Potential Causes of Alternative
Employment Arrangements, 66 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 874, 890 (2013).
54. Noah D. Zatz, Working Beyond the Reach or Grasp of Employment Law, in THE GLOVESOFF ECONOMY: WORKPLACE STANDARDS AT THE BOTTOM OF AMERICA’S LABOR MARKET 31,
35–36 (Annette Bernhardt et al. eds., 2008); see U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-15168R, CONTINGENT WORKFORCE 7 (2015) (noting that despite the difficulties in ascertaining a
clear definition of contingent workers, data suggests that there are millions of contingent workers
in the market).
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there are people who many in ordinary parlance might not even call
“workers,” but whom I choose to include in this spectrum because their
income derives primarily from their personal labor, that is, from
services that they personally perform, rather than from other people’s
labor or from capital investment. Included within this shade of the
spectrum are independent doctors, lawyers, engineers, dentists, and
other professionals, who are not employed by someone else and who
either have their own small storefront or are self-employed on paper but
work in, and for, larger facilities. These people typically have some
kind of professional degree or certification, earn middle to high
incomes, and are members of the professional social class. While they
may employ an administrative or support employee, they personally
provide the core services performed by their enterprise.55
A second set of workers who are often classified as independent
contractors, we might dub “soft professionals”—they generally do not
have a formal professional degree and may or may not identify with and
be considered part of the professional social class, but they have
considerable expertise in a relatively specialized field of work, are not
as easily individually replaceable as low-wage workers, and generally
earn middle incomes. This set of workers may labor in informational
technology; in the entertainment industry, particularly pre- and postproduction; repair and construction (electricians and plumbers); and the
beauty, massage, and personal care industries.
A third sizable set of workers classified as independent contractors
have relatively little formal education (or are unable to take advantage
of it in the labor market, due to migration across national borders or
other factors), may be considered and consider themselves working
class, are relatively easily replaceable by employers on an individual
level, and earn low wages. Many people in this category work as truck
drivers, taxi drivers or drivers for app-based ride-providing services,
laborers in building construction, in home healthcare, and as casual or
day laborers.56
55. This category of workers may receive softer antitrust scrutiny. See infra Part IV.B.2.
Under this scheme, a lawyer or doctor who is no one’s employee could obviously be classified as
primarily a worker or primarily a business owner, and the classification would depend upon the
number of production (as opposed to administrative) employees she has, and the proportion of the
time she spends on (and the income she derives from) core services personally performed by her
(engaging in lawyering or doctoring work), versus her ownership over and management of others’
income-earning labor (overseeing associates’ work, investing assets, etc.). Nothing in the
argument of this Article relies upon precisely demarcating that line, although the general factors
that would determine its location are useful to have in mind.
56. Plainly, there is overlap at each of these borders. For example, many laboring in the
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Finally, small commodity producers who rely in large part on
personal labor and lack market power should also be provisionally
included in the universe. Of especial historical importance are small
farmers, whose livelihoods were greatly affected by the concentrations
of economic power that antitrust originally sought to address and who
participated in historic alliances with labor organizations to address
their economic conditions.57
Any type of collective action aimed at improving pay rates or
working conditions might expose the groups of workers and economic
actors just described58 to antitrust liability. This rule, I aim to show in
the balance of this Article, is a powerful bludgeon with shaky
foundations.
D. Intersection with Work Law
It is well known that in the contemporary landscape of labor and
employment law, the question “who is an employee?” is an increasingly
dominant one, given the growth of “contingent labor” in the workforce
and the economy.
Contingent labor encompasses the various
mechanisms by which the traditional employment relationship, which is
to a great extent presupposed by extant work law, is attenuated by the
employer of labor: subcontracting, temporary work arrangements, and
retaining workers as “independent contractors” rather than employees.
Each of these arrangements abridges the reach of work law, but none so
completely as the independent contractor arrangement, which purports
to nullify the employment relation altogether.59
Workers and worker advocates have thus sought to re-establish the
reach of extant work law through the use of legal doctrines and
strategies whose contention is that although the new work arrangement
may not look like the traditional employment relationship in some
superficial respects, it is functionally equivalent to employment.
Misclassification refers to the contention that despite the nomenclature
adopted by the employer, a particular work arrangement meets the legal
test for the employer-employee relationship already contained in the

beauty and personal care industries are low-wage workers, and may earn less than many
independent contractor truck drivers.
57. See infra Part II.B (discussing origins of antitrust).
58. While this Article often focuses primarily on low-wage workers, many of its conclusions
are generalizable to the other groups of workers and economic actors as well. In future work, I
will more directly address the various considerations that might apply to regulating collective
action among the groups.
59. Zatz, supra note 54, at 34–36, 44–45.
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law. The central, but not only, factors in this determination relate to the
level of control that the putative employer exerts over the work
performed and the operations of which the work is a part.60 Another set
of factors applicable under many of the tests for employment status
takes into account the “economic realities” of the work relationship,
which are mainly indicia of the relative power of the two parties to set
the terms and conditions of the work performed.61
Because
employment status is the threshold question for various regulatory
schemes, a variety of definitions and tests apply, and a worker might in
theory be considered an employee for purposes of a certain statute and a
contractor for another.62
The misclassification strategy, however, is not sufficient to dispose of
the “independent contractor question.” There are practical, factual, and
doctrinal reasons for this. As an initial matter, there are the extremely
significant practical limitations that attend regulatory enforcement as
well as private litigation in terms of both resources and delay, which
constrain workers’ ability to establish employee status even where it is
almost certainly the proper legal conclusion.63 Beyond this, employers
possess a great deal of power to unilaterally dictate the very factual
conditions that determine whether the worker is legally an employee.
Indeed, a typical response to misclassification litigation is for employers
to adjust operations and the conditions of work so that employee status
is again thrown into question and so that they may continue to classify
workers as independent contractors under color of law. This point has
been made generally by Noah Zatz;64 by Julia Tomassetti in the specific
context of the FedEx litigation, one of the most significant episodes of

60. Id. at 35.
61. Id.
62. Id.; see also Marc Linder, Dependent and Independent Contractors in Recent U.S. Labor
Law: An Ambiguous Dichotomy Rooted in Simulated Statutory Purposelessness, 21 COMP. LAB.
L. & POLICY J. 187, 187 (1999) (noting that the application of hundreds of statutes and
regulations hinge on employee status).
63. See generally Scott Cummings, Preemptive Strike: Law in the Campaign for Clean
Trucks, 4 UC IRVINE L.R. 939, 1130–40 (describing how these obstacles have manifested in a
concrete instance, in the port trucking industry). As Cummings notes, “[t]he path was not easy.
In an industry of hundreds of small companies, misclassification litigation was necessarily a
piecemeal approach”; the strategy was dependent upon private firms willing to take a financial
risk on fees, and even a successful case would not compel reclassification. Id. at 1131–32. For
this and other reasons, misclassification litigation was the campaign’s “Plan C.” Id. at 1134.
64. See Noah D. Zatz, Beyond Misclassification: Tackling the Independent Contractor
Problem Without Redefining Employment, 26 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 279, 288–89 (2011)
(critiquing the “static view” of misclassification, which ignores both employers’ fundamental
control over the facts that determine employee status and the role of law in employers’ choices).
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misclassification litigation in the United States;65 and by Scott
Cummings in the context of the port truck drivers’ movement.66
Moreover, employer response aside, many low-wage workers may
not meet the legal test for employee status even under current
conditions. This may turn out to be true in segment of the “gig
economy,” as Uber, Lyft, and other app-based labor brokering services
are sometimes called; even courts are beginning to comment on the
potential limitations of the existing legal framework for determining
workers’ status under changing conditions.67 These facts are also
acknowledged in the academic literature as forming the basis for
various proposals that would go beyond the traditional employee and
independent contractor distinction.68 Finally, many non-employee
workers have chosen not to contest their independent contractor status
despite engaging in organizing activity. Notable examples are groups of
taxi drivers69 and of artists and art handlers.70 In either case, we are

65. Julia Tomassetti, From Hierarchies to Markets: FedEx Drivers and the Work Contract as
Institutional Marker, 19 LEWIS & CLARK L.R. (forthcoming 2016).
66. Cummings, supra note 63, at 1132 (noting that in the context of the port trucking
campaign, “[e]ven successful cases . . . often had the effect of simply making companies more
stringent about following the independent-contractor rules”). Cummings further states that
“industry lawyers conducted trainings . . . [o]ne such update recommended that companies ‘DO
NOT Use a Driver Handbook that looks like an employee manual,’ or require a driver to ‘wear a
company logo,’ ‘paint the truck a particular color,’ or ‘display a company ID card’”). Id. at 1138.
67. Judge Chen, in denying Uber’s motion for summary judgment in the currently pending,
high-profile wage and hour class action brought by its drivers, stated explicitly:
The application of the traditional test of employment—a test which evolved under an
economic model very different from the new “sharing economy”—to Uber’s business
model creates significant challenges. . . . It may be that the legislature or appellate
courts may eventually refine or revise [the Borello] test in the context of the new
economy. It is conceivable that the legislature would enact rules particular to the new
so-called “sharing economy.”
O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1153 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
68. These include proposals to regulate “dependent contractors” or to divorce many of the
benefits traditionally associated with employment from that status and to make them available on
some other basis instead. Linder, supra note 62; see also Richard R. Carlson, Why the Law Still
Can’t Tell an Employee When it Sees One and Why it Ought to Stop Trying, 22 BERKELEY J.
EMP. & LAB. L. 295, 301 (2001) (proposing “an approach to statutory coverage based on the
character of the transactions between the parties instead of the status of the parties”).
69. Dubal, supra note 48, at 50–56 (regarding San Francisco taxi workers); Interview with
Aaron Chappell, Campaign Manager, Org. Dep’t, AFL-CIO (July 17, 2015) (regarding drivers
organized with the National Taxi Workers Alliance) (interview notes on file with the author).
70. See, e.g., WORKING ARTISTS & GREATER ECON. (W.A.G.E.), http://www.wageforwork.
com (last visited Mar. 22, 2016) (noting the fair-pay certification scheme of W.A.G.E); ART
HANDLERS ALL. N.Y., http://www.arthandlersalliance.org/ (last visited Mar. 22, 2016) (noting
the organizing efforts of the Art Handlers Alliance of New York); see also Interview with Steve
Sewell, Art Handlers All. of N.Y. (Oct. 26, 2015) (interview notes on file with the author).
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talking about workers who sell their personal labor, earn relatively low
pay for that labor, and are price-takers in the market.71
Part I.B, supra, discussed antitrust liability for unilateral worker
collective action. In addition, any regulatory scheme that aims to
address collective action by such workers in anything but a purely
punitive manner, or aims to provide for minimum working standards,
will also come up against the outer limits imposed by antitrust. As the
organizing efforts of freelancers, independent contractors, and gig
economy workers continue to gain momentum, we can expect to see
such proposed schemes. Members of the New York City Council have
recently stated that they are currently developing this type of regulatory
scheme, prompted by the efforts of the Freelancers Union and other
organizing groups.72 The City of Seattle recently enacted an ordinance
granting collective bargaining rights to drivers for taxicab, limo, and
“transportation network companies” (encompassing Uber, Lyft and
other companies in the on-demand sector) who are classified as
independent contractors rather than employees.73 Local regulation, as
such schemes are likely to be, will probably face federal preemption
lawsuits not only under the “NLRA,”74 but also under antitrust.75
A corollary of the main point of this Article is thus that “fixing”
misclassification will not obviate the problem of non-employee workers
and antitrust liability, a problem that is likely to become more pressing
as freelance work becomes increasingly prevalent. To hope that
tinkering at the surface with the current legal classifications of workers
can, alone, suffice to solve the problem I am posing, is to ignore the
fundamental ways in which the underlying structure of antitrust law’s
71. There are many reasons, explored in the balance of this Article, not to expose such
workers to antitrust liability for collective action; for the present purpose, I wish to establish
simply that “misclassification” does not, as a factual matter, obviate the issue.
72. Samar Khurshid, City Council Developing New Protections for Workers in ‘Gig’
Economy, GOTHAM GAZETTE (Nov. 5, 2015), http://www.gothamgazette.com/index.php/
government/5971-city-council-developing-new-protections-for-workers-in-gig-economy.
73. SEATTLE, WASH., MUN. CODE §§ 630.310.110, 6.310.735 (2016), http://clerk.seattle.gov/~
legislativeItems/Ordinances/Ord_124968.pdf
74. It is worth noting that any preemption suit under the NLRA—which would have to rely
upon the contention that the NLRA embodies the congressional judgment to deny organizing
rights to non-employees, at least for the most part—would ultimately be parasitic, if not by direct
doctrinal path then by conceptual reliance, upon the outer limits set by antitrust, as well. This
point should become clearer after considering the argument of Part II, infra, and will also be
developed further in future work.
75. Indeed, as this Article was going to print, an industry group (the United States Chamber of
Commerce, no less) filed a lawsuit challenging the Seattle ordinance on grounds that it is barred
by antitrust law and by the NLRA. The complaint leads with the antitrust challenge. Complaint,
Chamber of Commerce v. City of Seattle, No. 2:16-cv-00322 (W.D. Wash., Mar. 3, 2016).
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relationship to labor shapes the current categories in the first place. To
be sure, a consideration of that deep relationship ought to lead us
eventually to a reconsideration of the current categories. But to start by
adjusting the boundaries between “employee” and “non-employee”—
with the idea that this will obviate the need to consider that deeper
relationship—will likely only repeat the mistake that led us to the
current situation (Part III, infra). That deeper relationship between
antitrust and workers informs everything from the legal consequences of
the current categories, to their definitions and borders, to the existential
struggles faced by workers who are left out in the cold by them. To
understand it, we must perform some conceptual excavation.
II. OF MARKETS, COMBINATIONS, AND SERVANTS: HOW ANTITRUST LAW
CAME TO PUNISH WORKER COLLECTIVE ACTION
The first federal antitrust statute, the Sherman Act, was not originally
intended to apply to worker collective action, and was instead aimed at
protecting traditional small American enterprise from the massive
business conglomerations that arose over the course of the nineteenth
century. Gilded Age courts, however, applied the statute to workers’
collective action. Their reasoning merits scrutiny as we analyze a
policy that has not only shaped American labor history, but also has
contemporary reverberations that are likely to only become louder.
Classicism, which dominated the common law at the time of the
Act’s passage, emphasized freedom of contract and free agency on the
part of market actors, in reaction to the social and regulatory
containment of markets that had characterized the prior era. But the
classicist project, as to antitrust and workers, was specifically designed
to invite regulation of workers’ freely chosen actions and contracts, not
to deflect it.
Understood as a component of the larger endeavor by the courts to
construct a national market, courts’ application of the Sherman Act to
worker collective action displayed their willingness to subordinate
workers’ freedom of action, both political and economic, to that project,
which was represented by the notion of “free flow of trade” in the cases.
That phrase was often used interchangeably with “freedom of contract,”
not only in the cases applying the Sherman Act to labor, but also in
other areas of law that likewise comprised the project of constructing
the national market. Yet the distinction between the two concepts is
made evident in the Sherman Act labor cases, because the application of
the Act could not be justified on freedom of contract grounds, and
instead required the justification involving the “free flow of trade.”
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While classicists argued that the Sherman Act ought to be extended
to workers on grounds of parity—because business was already subject
to it—the fact is that the will of business owners was never made to
bend to the “free flow of trade” in the way that the will of workers was.
An act and an omission together accomplished this: the judge-made
“corporate exemption,” an analogue of which workers never enjoyed,
and the relative lack of enforcement of Section 2 of the Act (regulating
mergers).
A. Classicist Trade Regulation and Nineteenth-Century Labor
Regulation
The Sherman Act regulates trade and, contentiously, labor.76 The
statute itself says nothing explicitly about labor or work, is very general
in its pronouncements, and invokes concepts (“restraint of trade”) that
were in flux and transition at the time of its drafting. The forms of trade
and labor regulation extant at the time of the passage of the Act are
therefore of some relevance in understanding its meaning.
The defining element of classicist trade regulation77 of the Gilded
Age period was its opposition to the sort of economic regulation that
had preceded it. Commercial law and trade regulation once looked very
different, often functioning to contain markets (rather than police
barriers to them).78 Moreover, commercial and trade regulation largely
existed in a mutually reinforcing relation with the collective action of
producers (rather than prohibiting it).79 Indeed, the original ancestors of
antitrust law date to a time before markets defined economic life:
doctrines such as forestalling (prohibiting the buying up of merchandise
before it reached the market; for example, buying up crops still in the

76. It regulated labor directly from shortly after its passage until the New Deal. It continued
to regulate labor indirectly throughout the New Deal period, and is likely to exert increasing
direct and indirect effects on workers in our current era.
77. My use of the term “classicism” is drawn from the work of antitrust scholar Herbert
Hovenkamp. However, my use of the term herein is somewhat broader and less historically
specific: I mean to include the overall approach to economic regulation that had freedom of
contract and free trade as its governing ideals, which means I may characterize some decisions
and commentary as classicist when Hovenkamp would not do so.
78. Herbert Hovenkamp, The Sherman Act and the Classical Theory of Competition, 74 IOWA
L. REV. 1019, 1021 (1989); see also HYLTON, supra note 13, at 32 (noting that while today courts
aim to enhance competition, “early market interference statutes served largely to suppress
competition”).
79. Gary Richardson, A Tale of Two Theories: Monopolies and Craft Guilds in Medieval
England and Modern Imagination, 23 J. HIST. ECON. THOUGHT 217, 233 (2001) (showing that in
some cases the edicts of economic collectives such as guilds were actually continuous with, and
even evolved into, local trade regulation).
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field), engrossing (prohibiting the stockpiling of merchandise in order
to raise prices), and regrating (prohibiting the buying and reselling of
merchandise in the same or neighboring markets after prices rise).80
Modern commentators, steeped in neoclassicism, may have a tendency
to see these doctrines as motivated by an anti-competitive policy.81 But
these policies likely had both anti-competitive and pro-competitive
effects. A better description might be that they were motivated by
something other than the contemporary idea of competition altogether—
which did not, after all, exist yet. They simply defined and regulated
trade and markets in the interest of social welfare, and that conception
of welfare was not particularly tied to the idea of market competition.82
Meanwhile, although the hierarchical and coercive character of labor
regulation inherited from the feudal era was a constant both prior to and
during the Gilded Age, it is likely that at least in the United States,
many more working people came under its purview during the Gilded
Age.83 In other words, prior to the transformation in which the national
market came to define economic life84 and the modern business
corporation replaced its almost unrecognizable pre-market ancestor,85
many working people labored outside the context of wage labor, and
thus outside master and servant law. Many working people thus

80. HYLTON, supra note 13, at 32; Richardson, supra note 79, at 218.
81. “The main difference between these early statutes and the Sherman Act is that courts
interpret federal antitrust law today as aiming to enhance competition, while the early market
interference statutes served largely to suppress competition.” HYLTON, supra note 13, at 32.
82. See Richardson, supra note 79, at 230 (recognizing that “trading regulations” functioned
to help ensure that economic activity was “in the general interest”); KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT
TRANSFORMATION: THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF OUR TIME 45–58 (2001)
(arguing that all economic regulation prior to the emergence of market economies was embedded
in that particular society’s conception of the overall social good, rather than existing in a separate
economic sphere in which market competition was the reigning ideal).
83. See infra Part II.A.2.
84. See generally RICHARD FRANKLIN BENSEL, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF AMERICAN
INDUSTRIALIZATION, 1877–1900 (2000) (describing the political construction of the national
market).
85. Their ancestor, the guild, combined the activities of both commerce and labor. As a legal
category, very early corporations were thus simply one species of the cooperative organizations
that economist Gary Richardson calls “occupational cooperatives.” Gary Richardson & Michael
McBride, Religion, Longevity, and Cooperation: The Case of the Craft Guild, 71 J. ECON.
BEHAV. & ORG. 172, 174 (2009). In the United States, “[p]rior to the 1840s, the character and
organization of American business enterprise was predominantly small-scale,” with “relatively
low levels of capitalization.” CHRISTOPHER L. TOMLINS, THE STATE AND THE UNIONS: LABOR
RELATIONS, LAW, AND THE ORGANIZED LABOR MOVEMENT IN AMERICA, 1880–1960, at 17
(1985); see also HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW, 1836–1937, at 13
(1991) (describing the pre-classical American business corporation).
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enjoyed a greater level of both legal and economic independence than
what became normal in the Gilded Age.86
As we shall see, these two streams, classicist trade regulation and
feudal labor regulation, converged in the application of the Sherman Act
to worker collective action. Meanwhile, the surviving minor strain of
republicanism, which had animated the Act in the first place, carried
forward echoes of the economic regulation that had preceded both the
trade and labor regimes of the Gilded Age.
1. Classicist Trade Regulation
According to the conventional view, the Sherman Act was
continuous with the common law of trade regulation. That body of law
was primarily concerned removing the vestiges of pre-market trade
regulation to the extent that they placed constraints on the activities of
market actors.87 Whether the official ideology of freedom of contract
and trade, and individual liberty emphasized in the common law,88 was
the source or the mechanism of that economic policy, it was certainly
closely bound up with it. At the same time, I contend that the classicist
notion of freedom of trade contained a basic equivocation, between the
clear liberty-based concept and a more nebulous concept often denoted
by the phrase the “free flow of trade.” This notion of “free trade” had
nothing to do with any person’s freedom, but with the unobstructed free
flow of commerce. . This second conception comes into full relief in
the cases that apply the Sherman Act to labor,89 where it actually trumps
the freedom of contract interests that would seem to militate in favor of
permitting the coordinated actions at issue.
In terms of distinguishing the official ideology of the classicists from
that of contemporary “neoclassicists,” Herbert Hovenkamp points out
that the primary concern of classicism was not competition in the
contemporary sense, but rather individual liberty for commercial
actors—in particular, freedom of contract.90 Classicism’s conception of
competition was derivative of the basic idea of liberty from constraints.
“For [American classicists] as well as the English classicists,
86. Christopher Tomlins, Subordination, Authority, Law: Subjects in Labor History, 47 INT’L
LAB. & WORKING-CLASS HIST. 59, 62–63 (1995) (stating that in its pre-market forms, the work
relationship was not “a single form of relationship but . . . multiple forms of relationship, some of
sanctioned abuse and abasement (those old disciplines), some of temporary and shifting
attachment, some of autonomy and self-direction” (emphasis added)).
87. Hovenkamp, supra note 78, at 1026.
88. Id. at 1021.
89. See infra Part II.B.2.
90. Hovenkamp, supra note 78, at 1021.
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competition meant both rivalry and freedom from constraints, such as
the exclusive privileges so common in the Mercantilist period.”91 For
them, and even well into the transition to neoclassicism, “competition
referred to a theory about liberty and free choice, not to a description of
price/cost relationships.”92
Price-fixing—the paradigmatic modern anticompetitive activity—
was not tortious under the classical common law, much less criminal.93
One can see why the common law was at best ambivalent: if freely
entered, such a contract does not violate individual liberty. “Cartels did
not jolt the common lawyer’s conscience because no one’s freedom was
being denied.”94
Further, classicism’s particular conception of
competition, which included competition between actors in adjacent
markets (i.e., vertical competition),95 made price-fixing more
understandable as rational and permissible, self-interested market
activity by one market actor (the seller) in competition with another (the
buyer), to which the other was free to respond.
Similarly, restraints of trade that prevented entry into a market—
restraints that the classical common law viewed as the primary enemy
of “free trade”—were problematic not because they hurt the consumer
or distorted the market by decreasing the “natural” number of
participants in a particular market, but because they violated the
individual economic liberty of the prospective entrant. “The historical
concern of the common law of contracts in restraint of trade was
coercion, or the elimination of noncontracting parties’ freedom to
act.”96 For this reason, the common law was “obsess[ed] with
consideration in cases challenging agreements in restraints of trade,”
such as non-compete clauses.97
In short, classicist principles generally favored commercial actors’
freedom to compete, including the freedom to vertically compete—for
sellers to compete with buyers, for example. Nevertheless, as we shall
see, classicists affirmatively sought, through the mechanism of the
Sherman Act, to curb workers’ freedom to vertically compete, that is, to
curb their freedom to compete with capital by acting collectively to
withhold labor upon condition of better wages or working conditions.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id. at 1025 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Id. at 1026–29.
Id. at 1027.
Id.
Id. at 1026.
Id. at 1027.
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To understand this, we require the related but distinct concept of the
“free flow of trade,” easily mistaken for a synonym of “freedom of
trade.” The concept itself came into full relief in the Sherman Act labor
cases, for that is where it operated independently of freedom of contract.
2. Labor Regulation in the Gilded Age
The Sherman Act became the first federal statute regulating labor.
The character of the pre-existing regulation of work is relevant to
understanding how the Sherman Act came to have that role.
In the late nineteenth century, the employment relation remained
within the province of the common-law courts, as the relation between
masters and servants had been for hundreds of years, while most other
realms of social life were by then the subject of modern statutes created
by democratically elected legislators.98 This meant not only that the
new democratic apparatus of lawmaking was mostly kept apart from the
workplace, but also that relatively more conservative judges, rather than
relatively more progressive legislators, were the lawmakers in this
province.99 The legal constitution of the employment relation at this
time was the great exception to classicism’s clarion call of economic
freedom; it carried over the hierarchy, with its concomitant restraints on
individual freedoms, that had been the defining element of feudal
society.100 At the same time, with the ascendancy of wage labor, many
more people and many more economic relationships were brought under
its purview.101

98. See generally KAREN ORREN, BELATED FEUDALISM: LABOR, THE LAW, AND LIBERAL
DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 79–91 (1991) (discussing the judicial governance of
master and servant); see also id. at 81 (“[J]udges by their ritual enforcement held up a structure of
domination that had existed since time out of mind.”); see also FORBATH, supra note 20, at 6
(“Nowhere else among industrial nations did the judiciary hold such sway over labor relations as
in nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century America.”).
99. See ORREN, supra note 98, at 15–16 (“[T]he substance of relations between employers and
employees still was under the ultimate jurisdiction of courts, as was the case in the Middle Ages,
and . . . the old common-law rules of labor governance had been left standing while other
institutions had been changed or dissolved.”).
100. Id. at 67 (explaining that while commercial interests came unfettered from earlier
constraints, labor remained subject to them: indeed, “commercial interests . . . were prospering on
the basis of the ancient labor regime still in place” and “workers continued to be governed by
quite different precepts, likewise endorsed as beneficial to what one judge” called the “province
of workingmen”); see also id. at 71–79 (“The order of labor”).
101. Tomlins, supra note 86, at 63 (“The eventual reduction of these multiple forms [of the
working relationship] to a single form was in good part shaped by the deployment in English and
American law of generic rules implementing uniform relations of subjection (master/servant) to
pertain between those worked and those for whom they worked.”).
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Karen Orren shows that the employment relation in nineteenthcentury America was suffused with substantive rights and obligations
that were assigned in part based upon status (as they had been for all
sectors of feudal society), and not just based upon the content of freely
bargained contracts.102 Many of these obligations, moreover, abrogated
workers’ personal freedoms in various ways. The character of
employment law in the late nineteenth century thus involved a kind of
subordination that co-existed uneasily with the fact that work is “the
prototypical voluntary behavior” on liberalism’s own principles.103
There are numerous examples of these substantive rights and
obligations rooted in feudal hierarchy that were still very much alive in
nineteenth century American employment law,104 but the most salient
are those limiting workers’ freedom to quit and those limiting collective
action to improve working conditions.105 The tort of enticement
dominated the courts’ regulation of workers’ collective action, and
demonstrates the ancient nature of the judicial regulation of labor well
into the nineteenth century: that action had remained more or less
constant for the six centuries prior.106 The basic reasoning was that
someone who “enticed” workers (servants) away from their work (or
“induce[d] him to leave his master”), in this case for the purpose of
holding out for higher wages, was liable for damages to the master.107
Enticement was often the basis for a charge or complaint of conspiracy,
and was on occasion used to prosecute concerted work stoppages aimed
at conditions such as non-payment of wages.108

102. See ORREN, supra note 98, at 68–117.
103. Id. at 24.
104. To take just one example, the principle of quicquid acquietur servo acquietur domino—
whatever is acquired by the servant is acquired by the master—comes down in a direct line from a
legal feature of villeinage, that anything acquired by him belonged to his lord. In the United
States, it was applied all the way through the late nineteenth century in the “moonlighting”
context to allow an employer to recover not only for any hours missed (and, of course, to dismiss
the worker) but actually to recover wages earned in the second job. This particularly underlines
the personal, not abstract or fungible, nature of the employment relationship, at least in the
direction of the duty from employee to employer. Id. at 78–79.
105. The right to quit, which judges generally formally protected within master-servant law,
was greatly circumscribed by the “performance of the entire contract” rule (and its interpretation
to allow employers to have almost any reason for discharge) for wages due, together with the long
span between pay periods. Although technically, employers also could not end the contract
without cause, in practice, courts allowed them almost any cause; whereas whether the servant
had just cause to leave was largely determined by the opinion of the master. Id. at 84–86.
106. Id. at 122–28.
107. Id. at 123.
108. Id. at 124.
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Drawing upon such common-law materials, the evolving law of labor
conspiracies came to authorize injunctions against concerted action in
the very late nineteenth century, giving rise to the (in)famous
“government by injunction.”109 Shifting and variable conceptions of
property were instrumental in grounding these labor injunctions.110 The
Sherman Act, once it was applied to worker collective action, became
another powerful tool to ground and expand the labor injunction (it also
allowed recovery of damages).111
The common-law bases for
injunctions and the old law of labor conspiracies died out as the modern
employment relation was born with the New Deal. The Sherman Act,
meanwhile, only grew in both practical and symbolic prominence. And
while the Act’s application to labor seemed to be cut short by the New
Deal, in truth it merely went underground, whence it continued to exert
influence and send up shoots.
B. The Sherman Act and Its Relationship to Labor
The Sherman Act was not originally intended to apply to the
activities of labor unions qua labor unions nor to worker collective
action.112
First, the Act was largely a product of the republicanism that was
current among much of the populace, the legislature, and the labor
movement in the late nineteenth century; that republicanism was quite
inconsistent with the prohibition of workers’ collective action to
improve their working conditions. Generally speaking, this
republicanism supposed that American society promised its members “a
basis of real equality” that had “economic and social,” not only legal or
formal, dimensions.113 It has been well documented that American
public opinion was constellated against the unprecedented
concentrations of capital in the post-Civil War era, and that this opinion

109. See generally FORBATH, supra note 20, at 59–97. The seminal, near-contemporaneous
text that documented the use of the labor injunction (and whose authors went on to become two
of the architects of the New Deal framework that succeeded it) was Felix Frankfurter and Nathan
Greene’s THE LABOR INJUNCTION (1930).
110. BENSEL, supra note 84, at 342; FORBATH, supra note 20, at 85–88.
111. BENSEL, supra note 84, at 343.
112. Cf. Herbert Hovenkamp, Labor Conspiracies in American Law, 1880-1930, 66 TEX. L.
REV. 919, 951 (1988) (suggesting that the “consensus view” is that the Act was intended to apply
to labor).
113. See, e.g., TOMLINS, supra note 85, at 34–35 (1985) (discussing the revolutionary
generation’s outlook for the future after the newfound liberty and independence brought by the
American Revolution).
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cut across party lines.114 President Grover Cleveland had this to say in
1888:
As we view the achievements of aggregated capital, we discover the
existence of trusts, combinations, and monopolies, while the citizen is
struggling far in the rear or is trampled to death beneath an iron heel.
Corporations, which should be the carefully restrained creatures of the
law and the servants of the people, are fast becoming the people’s
masters.115

President Benjamin Harrison echoed him shortly afterward.116
Senator Sherman himself had become an outspoken critic of trusts a few
years before.117 Antitrust was part of the political and legal response to
this unprecedented aggregation of economic power.118 The republican
orientation of the Sherman Act was much more concerned with
preserving small, traditional industry and business in the face of the
new, large enterprises, than it was with consumer protection, which was
likely a minor concern at best.119 It was even less concerned with
abstract ideals of free trade. This is evident in the fact that Senator
Sherman was not opposed to tariffs, while the late nineteenth century
“advocates of free trade” were.120 This republicanism was inconsistent
114. Joseph L. Greenslade, Labor Unions and the Sherman Act: Rethinking Labor’s
Nonstatutory Exemption, 22 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 151, 152–54 (1988); Elinor R. Hoffman, Labor
and Antitrust Policy: Drawing a Line of Demarcation, 50 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 9–19 (1983).
115. EARL W. KINTNER, THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS
AND RELATED STATUTES 58 (1978).
116. Id. at 60.
117. Notably, the reason we call it antitrust regulation is that the law of corporations was still
fairly restrictive; trusts were the comparatively unfettered vehicles chosen by early industrialists
to conglomerate investment until the corporate form was “liberalized” and became the primary
vehicle of raising investment for commercial activity.
118. See, e.g., TOMLINS, supra note 85, at 29–30 (characterizing them as mostly “symbolic,”
and describing how antitrust was part of the contemporaneous “debates over the aggregation of
economic power”).
119. Werner Troesken, The Letters of John Sherman and the Origin of Antitrust, 15 REV.
AUSTRIAN ECON. 275, 291 (2002).
Taken as a whole, the Sherman letters undermine the traditional view that consumers
lobbied for, and supported, antitrust because the trusts were increasing prices. All of
the letters Sherman received regarding antitrust were from small businesses, and only
one of these businesses, the John Deere Company, complained about pools and
combinations driving up prices.
Id.
120. Id. at 287.
The belief that reducing tariffs would help solve the trust problem was widely shared
by nineteenth century observers and advocates of free trade. . . . During the same
period, Democrats in both the house and senate introduced bills that would have
eliminated tariff protections in any industry dominated [by] monopolistic trusts.
Senator Sherman, however, continued to support high tariffs and opposed using tariff
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with punishing worker collective action. In fact, some of the core
embodiments of republicanism in the nineteenth century involved
collective action by workers,121 in the craft tradition122 and beyond into
the more radical tradition of the Knights of Labor.123
Second, in addition to this profound inconsistency with the original
animating sentiments behind antitrust, the legislative history expressly
supports the conclusion that the Sherman Act was not intended to
punish worker collective action. Richard Bensel concludes that “one of
the clearest themes in the legislative history was the notable reluctance,
even opposition, to including labor unions within the act’s scope.”124
Joseph Greenslade cites the many senators who expressed worry that
the bill might be applied to prevent “the laborers of the country . . .
[from] combin[ing] either for the purposes of putting up the price of
their labor or securing for themselves a better position in the world,”125
to whom Senator Sherman replied: “combinations of workingmen to
promote their interests, promote their welfare, and increase their pay . . .
are not affected in the slightest degree, nor can they be included in the
words or intent of the bill.”126 Legislators’ statements during the
passage of the later Clayton Act also support this ascription of intent, as
they expressed their disbelief that the courts had applied the Sherman
Act against combinations of workers.127 Attorney General Richard
Olney, a former railroad lawyer and certainly not an economic radical,
called the application of the Sherman Act to “the combination of
laborers known as a strike” a “perversion of a law from the real purpose
of its authors.”128
Greenslade also provides a convincing counter-explanation for the
main point relied upon by the “consensus view” within antitrust, that the
reductions to combat the trusts.
Id.
121. William Forbath, Ambiguities of Free Labor in the Gilded Age, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 767,
800–12 (describing “labor’s anti-capitalist republicanism” as offering a competing interpretation
of republican liberty to the narrow interpretation endorsed by Gilded Age, classicist courts).
122. See generally TOMLINS, supra note 85, at 32–59.
123. ALEX GOUREVITCH, FROM SLAVERY TO THE COOPERATIVE COMMONWEALTH: LABOR
AND REPUBLICAN LIBERTY IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 98–102 (2015) (“The Knights were
the first post-Civil War labor organization open to nearly all workers, including unskilled, black
and women workers . . . .” Labor republicans “were united by their use of republican ideas to
criticize wage-labor and to present cooperation as an alternative.”).
124. BENSEL, supra note 84, at 342–43.
125. Greenslade, supra note 114, at 155 n.30.
126. Id. at 155 n.33.
127. Id. at 160.
128. 1893 ATT’Y GEN. ANN. REP. xxvii–xxviii (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Sherman Act was meant to inhibit worker collective action. He points
out that a specific amendment exempting labor was considered but not,
in the end, adopted. In fact, Sherman did propose such an amendment
to his original bill, and the Senate adopted it. However, statements of
the consensus view usually leave out the fact that the Judiciary
Committee then rewrote the bill, shifting the emphasis from Sherman’s
original language, which had focused upon effects on consumer prices,
to the idea of restraint of trade.129 When the new bill came out of
committee, the same senators who had complained of the possible
distortion of the bill to punish “workingmen” were silent, presumably
because they did not worry that worker collective action would be
considered a restraint of trade.130
It would be wrong to read back into these legislators’ intent, a
century of development in antitrust doctrine and economic theory.
Remember that price-fixing was not yet the obvious wrong that it would
become with the full transition to neoclassicism. Without express
language about consumer prices, it was far from clear what a “restraint
of trade” really was; that concept was in massive flux at that time. The
fact that the courts went on to define it the way they did cannot be read
back into the legislative intent.
Yet the Sherman Act, originally the child of a republicanism that
opposed huge conglomerations of capital and sought to protect the small
enterprise and artisan of traditional American economic life, soon
enough became a weapon against the working people who labored for
those new conglomerations. What happened?
C. Parity: A Bridge from Feudal Labor Regulation to Modern Trade
Regulation
The classicists took on the application of the Sherman Act to punish
worker collective political and economic action as an affirmative
project, seeking a kind of parity between capital and labor in the Act’s
application. To be sure, this doctrinal project must be understood in
terms of the larger movement in law (deference to business
corporations’ decision-making) of which it was a part,131 and in light of
the still-larger policy project that movement served (building the
129. Greenslade, supra note 114, at 155–56.
130. Id. at 158.
131. See, e.g., TOMLINS, supra note 85, at 21–30 (describing the critical role of legal
institutions in their “regulation of property rights and promotion of economic development”—
and, thus, in bringing about an increasing deference to business corporations’ decision making—
even and especially against local regulation).
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national market society).132 In this Section, I consider how this broader
context informed the basic concepts (of freedom of contract and free
trade) employed within the cases. I argue that the doctrinal project was
deeply embedded in a sense of social hierarchy between buyers of labor
and sellers of labor—a hierarchy anchoring control over workers by
those who employed them—which was not cognizable on official
freedom of contract principles. The method by which classicists
achieved this aim contained a kind of double-speak regarding the
ascription of moral and legal agency to working people, which then
manifested in the early judicial decisions applying the Sherman Act to
worker collective action. Even had classicists not expressly invoked
this hierarchical and coercive legal tradition, the context of legal
subordination of labor in which the idea of parity operated rendered it
problematic, if not paradoxical. I contend that these paradoxes rest
ultimately upon an equivocation in the meaning of the “freedom”
invoked in the jurisprudence.
1. The Argument from Parity
Recall that classicist principles favored the freedom to compete—
including the freedom to vertically compete; that is, for actors in
adjacent markets to compete. The fact that classicists sought to curb
workers’ freedom in this regard, that is, to compete with capital by
acting collectively to withhold labor upon condition, thus requires
explanation. Before any courts addressed the issue, classicists argued in
treatises and other publications that there ought to be parity between
capital and labor in respect of their freedom to combine in furtherance
of their efforts to vertically compete (with consumers, and with labor on
capital’s part, and with capital on labor’s part).133 The argument from
parity then could be the claim that a particular instance of vertical
competition (between sellers of labor and buyers of labor) is unfair,
because one side is being subjected to strictures (regarding the ability to
exert collective power) that the other is not. In other words, if business
is going to be subject to these restrictions, then, out of fairness, labor
should be as well. Thus, the classicists were perhaps concerned with
horizontal competition only insofar as differential restrictions on

132. See generally BENSEL, supra note 84, at 289–354 (discussing the construction of the
“national market”).
133. See Hovenkamp, supra note 112, at 926–32 (describing the common-law treatise
tradition’s strong bent toward characterizing the law of combinations as treating “labor
combinations more favorably than business combinations” and urging that “the public policy
toward labor combinations ought to be the same as the policy concerning cartels”).
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combinations to limit that competition affected the balance of power
between capital and labor in vertical competition. Prominent lawyer
Arthur Eddy wrote:
The object of decisions and laws against combinations being to protect
the consumer against maintenance of price at abnormal levels, it
would naturally be supposed that both laws and decisions would be
directed impartially against combinations of both labor and capital;
that no discrimination would be made, since a combination of one
may affect prices in exactly the same way as a combination of the
other; but so far from there being no discrimination, it is well-settled
[that labor combinations are legal while capital combinations are
not.]134

Eddy’s concern was “fairness” and “impartiality” in the application
of a rule, whatever its content, not with furthering the purposes of the
rule itself.135 Lamenting the application of the “strict” rule of consumer
protection to capital while it is not applied to labor, he was moved to
comment: “The manifest injustice, not to say absurdity, of this condition
of things appeals to every fair-minded man.”136
The assertion of this “unfairness” was arguably made with a
presupposition of the very social hierarchy that neutrally applied
freedom of contract principles ought to have condemned. In other
words, in asserting that antitrust law’s failure to punish worker
collective action was unfair, classicists betrayed a normative
commitment to a hierarchy between workers and employers that should
have been anathema to them. Many classicists felt that the balance of
power between capital and labor was already tilted in labor’s favor.
Among the reasons they cited (for the background imbalance of power
between capital and labor) was America’s supposed labor shortages.137
But Hovenkamp also describes a more surprising strain that
“dominated” classicist thinking about labor: classicists’ concern with

134. ARTHUR EDDY, THE LAW OF COMBINATIONS: CONTRACTS IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE
1331 (1901) (emphasis added).
135. That Eddy, in particular, was not particularly interested in the consumer protection
content or purpose of the rule itself is also suggested by, among other things, the fact that he was
personally responsible, in his capacity as a corporate lawyer, for organizing the National Carbon
Company (out of many previously existing carbon companies), which soon controlled 75% of the
worldwide carbon market, as well as having a key helping hand in the incorporation of several
other massive oligopolies. Big Carbon Firms Combine: Three-Fourths of This Industry in the
World Included, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 1899, at 1.
136. EDDY, supra note 134, at 1331.
137. Hovenkamp, supra note 112, at 930.
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the relative social mobility between the working and owning classes in
the United States (as compared, for example, to Europe).
Equally important was the perception of easy worker mobility that
dominated most nineteenth century thought: any American laborer
could save a little money, borrow from others, and become an
entrepreneur himself. As treatise writer Theodore Sedgwick observed
as early as 1836, New England laborers could “lay up half their
wages” and within a few years they could either “settle as farmers in
the new states” or “undertake an independent business in the old.” On
the other hand, “[i]n Europe, the common rule [was], once a servant,
always a servant; once a mechanic, always a mechanic; once a tenant,
always a tenant . . . .”138

Such a “rule” would in fact be a barrier to market entry, a violation of
the most fundamental classicist principles. Construing the absence of
the rule as an imbalance in labor’s favor suggests an underlying
commitment to the hierarchical suppression of workers’ freedoms as
the natural order of things.
Direct reliance upon hierarchy by the classicists aside, there may be
enduring reasons to consider the distinctiveness of labor contracts,
which might pose problems for a categorical argument from parity. A
strong version of this distinctiveness is articulated by theorists from
Marx to Polanyi: if labor is a “fictitious commodity” then it is
nonsensical to posit an equivalence between its sellers and sellers of
actual commodities.139 However, it is not necessary to embrace the
strong version of this critique to see that labor contracts have some
distinctive features that might pose problems for a simple-minded
argument from parity. The republican tradition, which was associated
with the Sherman Act, certainly recognized this distinctiveness. Labor
republicans pointed to the hierarchy inherent in labor contracts together
with the differentials in both market power and wealth between the
parties that came to characterize such contracts, allowing employers to
unilaterally set terms.140 A growing strand of contemporary labor
economics recognizes these same dimensions of distinctiveness.141

138. Id. at 931.
139. POLANYI, supra note 82, at 75 (“Commodities are . . . objects produced for sale on the
market . . . . But labor, land, and money are obviously not commodities . . . . Labor is only
another name for a human activity which goes with life itself, which in its turn is not produced for
sale but for entirely different reasons, nor can that activity be detached from the rest of life, be
stored or mobilized . . . .”).
140. GOUREVITCH, supra note 123, at 106–16 (discussing the labor republicans’ idea of the
distinctiveness of labor contracts: “material domination” grounded in absence of wealth on the
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2. Implementing Parity in the Courts
The early wave of antitrust cases that implemented what I have been
calling the argument from parity, applying the Sherman Act to regulate
and punish worker collective action, relied upon the ambiguity in the
meaning of free trade that was mentioned earlier. It is in these cases
that the meaning of “free flow of trade” is brought into clear relief, for
here (unlike in, for example, the economic due process cases) it operates
in logical opposition to freedom of contract rather than in harmony with
it. These cases protected the free flow of trade—necessary to the
constitution of new markets, particularly the national market—against
workers’ liberty interests in collective economic and political action
with respect to their working conditions and livelihoods. 142 In doing so,
they invoked a long tradition of subordinating workers and their
interests to their employers’ and to other societal interests, expressly
relying upon their status as workers to do so, contrary to what freedom
of contract would prescribe. This early interpretation of the Sherman
Act was also the bridge to the modern, neoclassicist antitrust framework
that would take the application of the Act to labor, absent a specific
statutory exemption, for granted.
a. The Workingmen’s Amalgamated Case: Three Ambiguous “Evils”
The story of how the bridge was built begins with a massive general
strike in New Orleans that grew primarily out of the desire of drayage
drivers (“draymen”) and warehouse workers to improve their wages and
working conditions.143 The actions included the coordinated stoppage
part of workers; market power on the part of employers allowing them to unilaterally set terms,
namely long hours and low pay; and the hierarchy and control implied by all the contract “left
unsaid,” requiring the worker to “passively obey the commands of the employer”).
141. See, e.g., ALAN MANNING, MONOPSONY IN MOTION (2003) (focusing especially upon
differentials in market power and wealth as creating economic inefficiencies).
142. This Subsection focuses primarily on a close reading of the first published decision to
apply the Sherman Act in this way, with the aim of demonstrating the continuity with the earlier
tradition of labor regulation as well as the ambiguity in the use of the concept “free trade.” It is
not the only significant decision from the Gilded Age period to apply the Sherman Act against
workers. Some other decisions are discussed, though more briefly, infra. Moreover, the same
year as Workingmen’s Amalgamated, see supra Part II.C.2.a, another federal district court also
applied the Sherman Act to worker collective action. However, in that case, what the court
considered the special regulatory and factual situation of the railroads (which were presumed to
justify greater judicial intervention in labor disputes, through the device of judicial receivership
and on the basis of additional statutes specific to the railroads) played a crucial part in the court’s
reasoning. Waterhouse v. Comer, 55 F. 149, 154 (S.D. Ga. 1893).
143. United States v. Workingmen’s Amalgamated Council of New Orleans, 54 F. 994, 995
(E.D. La. 1893); FORBATH, supra note 20, at 71 (“The first application of the Sherman Act to
industrial strife occurred in a tumultuous New Orleans longshoremen’s strike, which tied up the
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of work (the work, primarily, of transporting goods to and from the Port
of New Orleans), public demonstrations, attempting to persuade others
to join in the stoppage, and finally, the participation of other workers in
the city not directly involved in the transportation of these goods.144
The relatively brief district court opinion allowed an injunction to be
issued against various workers’ organizations that had organized the
work stoppage and pickets.145 The opinion hardly reads as if it were
deciding a tremendously significant issue of first impression: namely,
whether the new Sherman Act should in principle apply to the collective
action of workers to improve their working conditions. Rather, it
disposes with that issue as if it were a mere preliminary. 146 The
decision was significant because not only was it the first decision to
apply the Sherman Act to worker collective action, but also because the
Supreme Court’s seal of approval on that extension of the Act, about a
decade and a half later, specifically endorsed it.147
The Louisiana district court stated the primary legal question it was
deciding was whether the facts before it were “for the purpose of
restraining . . . commerce.”148 In support of the court’s conclusion that
“there can [not] be any question but that the combination of defendants
was in restraint of commerce,”149 we can glimpse three possible
wrongs: (1) coercion, such as violence or intimidation, directed by some
workers or combinations of workers toward other workers with the aim
of preventing them from working; (2) the simple fact of “slowing” or
“stagnating” commerce, by whatever means and for whatever end; and
finally, (3) the individually voluntary and coordinated decisions by
numerous workers to cease (or slow) their work, conditioned upon some
improvement in the terms and conditions of work for all. Of these, the
last is the only one that may plausibly translate into the contemporary
antitrust framework: an intentional constriction of supply aimed at
influencing price (or at influencing other terms of the bargain, which
neoclassicists would consider equivalent to price). Wrongs (1) and (2)
played important, possibly dispositive, roles in the Workingmen’s
Amalgamated decision; yet neither can be translated into the

city’s interstate and foreign commerce.”).
144. Workingmen’s Amalgamated Council, 54 F. at 995, 999–1000.
145. Id. at 1000.
146. Id. at 996.
147. See Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274, 310 (1908) (endorsing the extension of the Sherman
Act).
148. Workingmen’s Amalgamated Council, 54 F. at 995.
149. Id. at 999.

15_PAUL FINAL .DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1006

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

4/2/2016 10:19 AM

[Vol. 47

contemporary framework, and Wrong (3) must be read in the context of
both. Further, Wrong (3) itself is put forth not merely as a special
instance of the general proposition, “sellers of commodities may not
constrict supply in order to influence price,” but rather as the specific
proposition, “workers may not stop working in order to influence wages
and working conditions.”
In the opinion, Wrongs (1) and (2) are immediately evident in the
court’s initial statement of the issue. The court first described the
decision made by workmen’s organizations to “discontinue business”
including “transporting goods which were being conveyed from state to
state, and to and from foreign countries.”150 When employers
attempted to replace the union workers with non-union workers, they
were met with “intimidation springing from vast throngs of the union
men assembling in the streets, and in some instances by violence”
(Wrong (1)).151 The result was that, by the intentional acts of the
defendants, “not a bale of goods constituting the commerce of the
country could be moved” (Wrong (2)).152 The question was, did these
facts establish a cause under the statute? If the admittedly “lawful”
organizations of workmen “adopt and further unlawful purposes and do
unlawful acts . . . the associations themselves become unlawful.”153 So
far, so clear. Everything then rode on what the “unlawful purposes” and
“unlawful acts” were. The court answered that question as follows:
“The evil, as well as the unlawfulness, of the act of the defendants,
consists in this: that, until certain demands of theirs were complied with,
they endeavored to prevent, and did prevent, everybody from moving
the commerce of the country” (Wrong (3)). 154
The “certain demands,” of course, consisted not in ransoms or some
other inherently illegal purposes, but in moderately improved working
conditions and wages, together with recognition of a collective
bargaining representative (demands that, incidentally, would later
become state-sanctioned purposes in the New Deal society). It is not
academic to note this, because in the law of combinations from which
the court was here borrowing, overtly nefarious and illegal aims were
often the actual aims of the combinations at hand. In the identification
150. Id. at 1000
151. See id. (leaving aside the question of what shall count as coercion or intimidation in such
circumstances, and granting arguendo that at least some actions that would legitimately qualify as
unlawful harassment or coercion occurred).
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
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of the workers’ “certain demands” with “evil,” (i.e., Wrong (3)), we see
the bridge to neoclassicism. In the “endeavoring to prevent everybody”
we see the operation again of Wrong (1), which was probably necessary
to justify the result in the classicist period. In the “from moving the
commerce of the country,” we see Wrong (2), the threat posed by
workers’ choice not to work.
i. Violence and Coercion Toward Unwilling Third Parties
Beginning with Wrong (1): was the “evil” the courts ascribed to the
workers, “prevent[ing]” others from “moving the commerce of the
country” or refusing to move the commerce of the country themselves?
The former does a great deal of work in the opinion. Yet plainly, the
defendants did not prevent “everybody” from doing so; plenty of
individuals, including the defendants themselves, refused to do so quite
voluntarily. The court had before it a voluminous evidentiary record
resulting from the parties’ vigorous contestation of precisely how
significant or extensive the defendants’ efforts were in preventing others
from moving the commerce of the country. The court of appeal, in
affirming the district court, noted that the latter had wide discretion to
decide that factual contest as it apparently did,155 but the district court
opinion itself contained no express finding of fact regarding the extent
of any violence or coercion directed at willing and able workers. On the
contrary, the court acknowledged the vast number of coordinated,
voluntary individual decisions by workers that comprised the strike,
describing the matter before it as a “gigantic and widespread
combination”—implying voluntary decisions to agree—among the
workers of New Orleans, spanning a “multitude of separate [workers’]
organizations,” all aimed at a work stoppage that would get the attention
of those who profited from the “whole business of the city,” who were
also the ones who controlled the economic and material circumstances
of the conspirators’ lives.156 Indeed, it is fairly plain that if there had
not been widespread agreement among a large number of workers to
engage in the action—that is, if there had not been a critical mass of
voluntary individual decisions involved in the coordinated action—the
City, the employers, and the court would not have bothered with it in
the first place. Not even the district court opinion ever really denied
this.

155. Workingmen’s Amalgamated Council of New Orleans v. United States, 57 F. 85 (5th
Cir. 1893) (issuing a single-page, summary affirmance).
156. Workingmen’s Amalgamated Council, 54 F. at 995.
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Yet, it seems that the court also predicated its antitrust analysis to a
great extent on the proposition that intimidation “in some instances by
violence” of others (employers or third-party workers) became a central
means of the collective action, that is, Wrong (1). This idea pervades
the opinion. Even after articulating Wrong (3) toward the end of its
discussion, the district court chooses to end the opinion by again
identifying the central evil at hand as the improper coercion of others,
together with the halting of commerce—namely, a repetition of Wrongs
(1) and (2), with no mention of the “certain demands,” Wrong (3), that
allegedly motivated both:
It is the successful effort of the combination of the defendants to
intimidate and overawe others who were at work in conducting or
carrying on the commerce of the country, in which the court finds
their error and their violation of the statute. One of the intended
results of their combined action was the forced stagnation of all the
commerce which flowed through New Orleans. This intent and
combined action are none the less unlawful . . . .157

This is striking not only in that this crucial proposition is never truly
endorsed by the fact finder. It is remarkable also in that, in order to
proscribe such conduct, or combinations of men employing such means,
the court had no need to invoke the Sherman Act in the first place.
Such combinations would already have been illegal under any
interpretation of the common law at the time, and not just as a matter of
economic regulation. It seems that the court went out of its way to
apply the new statute.
ii. Interrupting Commerce by Refusing to Work
The conception of free trade as “the uninterrupted flow of trade”
allowed the court to effectively require workers to work in order to
prevent “a restraint of trade,” that is, a violation of the Sherman Act.
The court’s concern with building and protecting the nascent national
market is evident in its articulation of this requirement.
In its short decision, the court repeatedly stated that the workers
stopped, and intended to stop, commerce by not working: “threatened
that . . . all the men . . . would leave work”; “the whole business of the
City of New Orleans was paralyzed”; “flow of commerce . . . [was]
purposely arrested”; “transportation of the goods and merchandise from
the government warehouses to the landings was forcibly stopped”;
“enforced a discontinuance of labor in all kinds of business, including
157. Id. at 1000 (emphasis added).
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the business of transportation of goods and merchandise which were in
transit through the city of New Orleans”; “not a bale of goods
constituting the commerce of the country could be moved”; “forced
stagnation of all the commerce which flowed through New Orleans”;
“should the journeymen bakers refuse to work.”158 In most of these
instances, the court mentions the interruption of work and commerce as
a stand-alone fact, not conditioned upon a demand of improved wages
or conditions—demonstrating that it saw it as an evil in itself (not as an
evil only if used to influence price).
Indeed, the court at one point actually seemed to reason that
“secur[ing] . . . the employment of none but union men” is not in itself
the wrong; this, of course, is the potentially monopolistic purpose that a
contemporary court (putting aside for a moment the labor exemption)
might condemn. Rather, it suggested that the wrong is the means—
halting work, and thereby commerce—by which that purpose was
achieved, putting a primacy on the interruption of commerce by the
refusal to work:
The defendants urge . . . that the combination to secure or compel
the employment of none but union men is not in the restraint of
commerce. To determine whether the proposition urged as a defense
can apply to this case, the case must first be stated . . . . The
combination setting out to secure and compel the employment of none
but union men in a given business, as a means to effect this
compulsion, finally enforced a discontinuance of labor in all kinds of
business, including the business of transportation of goods and
merchandise which were in transit through the city of New Orleans,
from state to state, and to and from foreign countries. When the case
is thus stated . . . I do not think there can be any question but that the
combination of the defendants was in restraint of commerce.159

The court very clearly stated that in order to determine whether the
defendants’ pursuit of “the employment of none but union men” in
certain industries was legal, it had to consider the means defendants
employed to secure this aim. Because those means consisted in “a
discontinuance of labor in all kinds of business”—significant and
voluminous business constituting interstate commerce—there could be
no question but that the combination was in restraint of commerce. This
is a precise inversion of neoclassical antitrust analysis, which would be
concerned with the potentially monopolistic end. Instead, it evidences
158. Id. at 995–96, 999–1000.
159. Id. at 999 (emphasis added).
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the old obsession with workers who dare to not work, as one of the
greatest social threats around.160
In that older line of thinking, workers’ status within commerce is as
objects, not as agents, and any expression of their agency within that
sphere is an affirmative threat. Expression of agency aimed at the
purpose of not working, thereby threatening commerce, is the most
threatening of all. This brings out the fundamental paradox of this
notion of parity, which ascribes to workers the status of commercial
agents (in the result) as well as objects (in the reasoning).
Once again, as with Wrong (1), the court relied upon the old
common-law tradition regulating workers, in order to find a violation of
the Sherman Act in their collective action to improve their working
conditions. While Wrong (1) demonstrates the logical superfluity of the
court’s invocation of the new Act, Wrong (2) reveals how the court
relied upon the hierarchical and coercive character of the common-law
tradition with respect to workers, in doing so.
iii. A Work Stoppage Aimed at Improvement of Working Conditions
And what of the sole “evil” identified by the court that we may
translate into a contemporary antitrust framework? As I have argued, it
is not possible to interpret the court’s holding as consisting only or even
primarily in this, for the following reasons. First, the opinion is shot
through with repeated invocations of Wrongs (1) and (2). As argued
above in the discussion of Wrong (2), the court expressly stated that the
evil was the means employed—that is, the cessation of work to interrupt
commerce.161 And, on the heels of its single viable identification of
Wrong (3) as an evil in itself, it again returned to its exaggerated focus
upon the coercion of third parties—almost as if it felt it immediately
had to buoy up insufficiently firm ground. Thus, I do not think there is
a viable reading of the opinion in which the court primarily grounds the
application of the Sherman Act to worker collective action upon Wrong
(3).
However, assuming arguendo that Wrong (3) was one of the court’s
grounds of decision, the justification for it, too, was based upon ancient
notions of hierarchy and control. That is because the court’s
condemnation of workers’ conditional work stoppage was in terms that
are highly specific to the workers’ status as workers, rather than
generally as sellers of commodities (of which labor, in the market
160. ORREN, supra note 98, at 71–75.
161. Workingmen’s Amalgamated Council, 54 F. at 999.
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society, happens to be one type). For its holding that this conduct is a
violation of the Sherman Act, the court relied upon an old state court
case applying the common law of labor combinations, whose elements
are specific to the acts of workers, not sellers of commodities in general.
The court spoke not of price-fixing, constriction of supply, or distortion
of price. Instead, it had no sooner mentioned the workers’ “certain
demands” as comprising an aspect of the “evil” under the statute, than it
was quoting a then-sixty-year-old New York criminal case that spoke
and reasoned in terms of workers qua workers, and whose holding was
limited to workers:
What is meant by “restraint of trade” is well defined by Chief Justice
Savage . . . . “Should the journeymen bakers refuse to work unless for
enormous wages, which the master bakers could not afford to pay,
should they compel all journeymen in the city to stop work, the whole
population must be without bread . . . . Such combinations would be
productive of derangement and confusion, which certainly must be
injurious to trade.”162

The quote and the case it was taken from are instructive regarding the
court’s perspective on worker collective action.163 People v. Fisher,
upon which the Workingmen’s Amalgamated district court relied in
order to hold that the New Orleans strike was a restraint of trade and
thus a violation of antitrust law, had applied the common law of
criminal conspiracy to punish an 1833 “conspiracy to raise wages” by
the journeymen shoemakers of Geneva, New York.164 The New York
case held that journeymen, who are paid wages by the masters, commit
a crime by withholding labor on condition of higher wages—not that
sellers commit a crime by combining to inflate prices in the product
market. So in applying the argument from parity to extend a piece of
commercial regulation to workers on the theory that they are sellers of
commodities and thereby subject to that regulation, the court relied
upon sixty-year-old precedent regarding workers’ combinations, not
regarding combinations of merchants. Moreover, every single point of
authority, most of them English cases and statutes, collected in Fisher
regard workers collectively withholding labor to affect wages or
162. Id. at 1000 (quoting People v. Fisher, 14 Wend. 9 (N.Y. 1835) (emphasis added)).
163. Note that it also again makes reference to the workers’ “refus[al] to work,” longconnected with the idea of social “derangement and confusion,” in a manner that seems to go
beyond the “enormous wages” themselves. Thus, in one of the few passages in the opinion that
articulates Wrong (2)—the only one that could make the journey into contemporary antitrust
analysis—the long shadow of Wrong (3) again appears. Fisher, 14 Wend. at 19.
164. Id. at 15.
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working conditions.165 The Fisher opinion also invoked statutes
regulating workers’ combinations dating to the “reign of Edw[ard] VI
and Geo[rge] III, which subject workmen conspiring either to reduce the
time of labor or to raise their wages, to the punishment of fine and
imprisonment,” that is, to the repressive, highly status-specific
regulation of the eras 1547–1553 and 1760–1820, respectively.166 Not
one point of authority contained in Fisher regarded sellers of
commodities collectively engaged in constricting supply in order to
influence price; all concerned workers.
In other words, Fisher reasoned and spoke in terms of what it is
appropriate for workers to do and not do, not in terms of what it is
appropriate for sellers of commodities to do and not do. This seems to
betray a view of workers that is somewhat in tension with the idea that
they are simply an instance of the category “seller of a commodity”—
for otherwise, why not frame the principle in terms of the latter? The
tradition of social control of working people embodied in the common
law of employment, which is expressly continued in Fisher and invoked
as authority in Workingmen’s Amalgamated, in fact views workers as
having a distinct status meriting specific, coercive legal treatment.167
This may not be surprising in the context of Fisher, but should be
surprising in the context of Workingmen’s Amalgamated. After all, that
was the decision that purported to extend to workers the free agency
applied to men of commerce—to bring parity to how workers and
businessmen were treated in the economic regulation of their collective
action.168
Fisher in fact represented the far end of the spectrum in terms of the
American common law’s repression of workers. William Forbath
identified it as among a “famous handful of cases in the first quarter of
the [nineteenth] century [that] seemingly held mere combinations to
raise wages criminal. . . . These cases are the basis of the view that
American labor law’s trajectory over the nineteenth century was one
from repression toward relative toleration.”169 The first court to apply

165. Id.
166. Id.
167. ORREN, supra note 98, at 71–75.
168. Not only is the court’s reasoning entirely specific to workers qua workers, but it
expressly reasons from outcomes—the reasonableness of the prices set for labor in the overall
social order (a consideration that would not be allowed in the neoclassical framework, wherein
the reasonableness or social utility of the prices set is no defense to anticompetitive conduct, as
set out further in Part IV, infra).
169. FORBATH, supra note 20, at 60 n.2.
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the Sherman Act to worker collective action aligned itself with the far
end of the common law’s spectrum of worker “repression,” a feudal
tradition of ancient vintage that viewed workers as lower in the social
order than those for whom they worked, and thereby for many purposes
not entitled to free agency over their actions.
The purpose for which the court invoked its age-old power to
subordinate workers’ economic and political freedom was that of
avoiding “derangement and confusion” that would be “injurious to
trade.”170 In other words, it was the specific project of constructing a
continuous national market and the emerging market society: ensuring
that capital could earn a “reasonable” rate of return,171 enough to ensure
continuing development, production, and investment. The judicial
project of market construction thus paralleled the economic and
physical project of building railroads, factories, and taming new natural
resources, and it required abrogating workers’ political and economic
freedom to accomplish.
b. The Danbury Hatters Case
Loewe v.
better known as the Danbury Hatters case, grew
out of one of the first union label boycotts, or coordinated “sympathy
strikes,” and in it, the Supreme Court “confirmed what a majority of
lower federal courts”—Workingmen’s Amalgamated and United States
v. Debs173—“had previously held: “that the Sherman Act applied to
Lawlor,172

170. United States v. Workingmen’s Amalgamated Council of New Orleans, 54 F. 994, 1000
(E.D. La. 1893) (quoting Fisher, 14 Wend. at 19).
171. BENSEL, supra note 84, at 289–354 (“The Political Construction of the National
Market”). Consider the more obvious arm of this judicial market-building enterprise: the Lochner
line of substantive due process cases, in which “any regulatory act that prevented a person or
corporation from earning a reasonable return on invested capital was deemed a constitutional
violation.” Id. at 334. The same courts invoked the same language—”unobstructed” or “free,”
“flow” or “course,” of “trade” or “commerce”—in both lines of cases to signify the same larger
project.
172. 208 U.S. 274 (1908).
173. United States v. Debs, 64 F. 724, 729 (N.D. Ill. 1894). Debs arose out of the national
Pullman strike, “the web of sympathetic boycotts of Pullman cars by the American Railroad
Union in response to Pullman’s ruthless wage cuts and his intransigent refusal to confer with his
employees.” FORBATH, supra note 20, at 74. To “virtually all of the nation’s legal elite,
conservative and reformist alike,” the strike became a symbol of an anarchic threat posed by
industrial unionism. Id. The federal judiciary responded with the usual sweeping injunctions,
also many times calling in federal troops and presiding over mass arrests, although there was little
violence or property damage before the crackdowns. Judge William H. Taft wrote in
contemporaneous letters to his wife: “Until they have had much bloodletting, it will not be better”
and “They have killed only six of the mob as yet. This is hardly enough to make an impression.”
Id. Debs and other union officers were prosecuted under, inter alia, the Sherman Act; the
Supreme Court denied their writ of habeas corpus on alternate grounds, namely Congress’s
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combinations of workers.”174 As painfully chronicled by William
Forbath in his seminal work on the Gilded Age judiciary’s effect upon
the labor movement, the saga was devastating to the morale of that
movement, sucking many of its resources in those key years and
robbing it of some of its most successful tactics.175
Significant as it was in its impact, Danbury Hatters delved no deeper
into the justification for bringing worker collective action under the
Sherman Act than had Workingmen’s Amalgamated.176 In fact, the
Supreme Court largely relied on the reasoning of the Louisiana federal
district court on this point, quoting it at length for the proposition that
workers were not to be exempted from the Sherman Act.177 Other than
that lengthy excerpt, the only other reasoning the Court offered for its
application of the Sherman Act to worker collective action was this
assertion: “The records of Congress show that several efforts were made
to exempt, by legislation, organizations of farmers and laborers from the
operation of the act, and that all these efforts failed, so that the act
remained as we have it before us.”178 As an inference about legislative
intent, this is likely incorrect.179 It is also incorrect that any such
amendments “failed”: the only one that was proposed in fact passed,
and no amendment was proposed to the rewritten bill (and thus could
not have failed).180 As an assertion that there did not at that time exist
an express labor exemption, it is of course true, but that alone does not
answer the question whether the Act ought to regulate worker collective
action.
The Court also quoted Workingmen’s Amalgamated’s statement of its
central holding (in addition to its statement that the Sherman Act applies
to workers), apparently adopting its reasoning for why worker collective
action was a restraint of trade under the Sherman Act,181 and thereby
perpetuating its reliance upon the common law’s repression of free
action by workers qua workers.
authority over interstate commerce, particularly as exercised in various statutes specific to
railroads and the carriage of the mails.
174. FORBATH, supra note 20, at 92.
175. Id. at 92–94.
176. The Court did not rely on any of the reasoning of the district court in Debs, simply noting
that its affirmance on alternate grounds was not meant to disapprove the lower court’s application
of the Sherman Act. Loewe, 208 U.S. at 298–99.
177. Id. at 301–02.
178. Id. at 309–10.
179. See supra Part II.B.
180. Id.
181. Loewe, 208 U.S. at 302.
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Even more directly, although it refrains from itself articulating its
principles in terms that rely upon workers’ status qua workers, the
Danbury Hatters opinion included the following reliance on authority:
The combination charged falls within the class of restraints of trade
aimed at compelling third parties and strangers involuntarily not to
engage in the course of trade except on conditions that combination
imposes; and there is no doubt that (to quote from the well known
work of Chief Justice Erle on Trade Unions) “at common law every
person has individually, and the public also has collectively, a right to
require that the course of trade should be kept free from unreasonable
obstruction.”182

This (“the course of trade should be kept free from unreasonable
obstruction”)183 is the same concept of free trade employed in
Workingmen’s Amalgamated. Such obstruction includes not only
affirmative acts of interference, but also, it turns out, the omissions of
not working, if those omissions are entered into collectively and
deliberately. The free flow of national trade had to be protected because
building the national market was a priority for the Court.
Again, the project of building the emerging market society met (and
relied upon) the status-specific tradition of restrictions upon workers’
freedom of action. There was no further elaboration, footnote, or
explanation in the opinion regarding the “well known” source
mentioned, which was a treatise relating to workers and their
organizations, not to sellers of commodities or trade combinations
generally. Sir William Erle was at one time Chief Justice of the Court
of Common Pleas, and a member of the Commission on Trade Unions
created by Parliament to make recommendations to it, and who later
authored The Law Relating to Trade Unions.184 Erle seemed to endorse
then-current English common-law ideas about what it was proper for
workingmen to do vis-à-vis the free flow of trade. For example,
deciding whether a group of workers could be convicted under the 1823
Master and Servant Act for willfully absenting themselves from their
work in a shipyard, he had in another case written:
[The statute] was meant to protect persons who had heavy contracts to
complete within a certain time, and to give them a summary remedy in
case their workmen left them without a reasonable excuse. Under
some circumstances a person employed to do a particular job would

182. Id. at 294–96 (emphasis added).
183. Id.
184. WILLIAM ERLE, THE LAW RELATING TO TRADE UNIONS (1869).

15_PAUL FINAL .DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1016

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

4/2/2016 10:19 AM

[Vol. 47

not be the servant of his employer, but not when the employment is
such as in this case.185

In other words, that statute was meant to protect commerce from
workmen (not working). This is the very theme that pervades the
Workingmen’s Amalgamated opinion. The “free flow of commerce”
argument thus justifies curtailing workers’ political and economic
freedom to organize for betterment of their conditions.
3. The Corporate Exemption
The key move in the foregoing cases—relying upon the ambiguity in
the concept “free trade” in order to curtail workers’ freedoms for the
purpose of constructing the emerging market society—is brought into
especial relief when we consider the same courts’ and thinkers’ attitude
toward business corporations. In the Gilded Age, labor collective action
was prosecuted far more than businesses’ under the Sherman Act.186
Beyond this, businesses had little need to engage in overt price-fixing,
for a combination of the “corporate exemption” and the relative lack of
regulation of mergers allowed them to simply collect market power
within individual firms.
Classicism actively promoted that central device of business
combination, the corporation, as a site of economic and ultimately
political power. As previously mentioned, early corporations were
quasi-public creatures that operated under a web of constraints for
specific state-sanctioned purposes, not legal forms used to collect
capital while limiting liability. 187 These constraints were gradually
lifted over the course of the nineteenth century, via various changes in
the law of corporations that increasingly insulated owners and
shareholders from liability while enabling the separation of ownership

185. Lawrence v. Todd (1863) 143 Eng. Rep. 562, 14 C.B. (N.S.) 554; ROBERT J. STEINFELD,
COERCION, CONTRACT, AND FREE LABOR IN THE 19TH CENTURY 145, 151 (2001). In another
case, the Chief Justice wrote, in deciding whether a wage statute applied: “We should look at the
work done and the position in life of the parties.” Id. at 145.
186. EDWARD BERMAN, LABOR AND THE SHERMAN ACT 271 (1930) (explaining that the first
twenty cases prosecuted under the Act targeted worker collective action to improve working
conditions); BENSEL, supra note 84, at 342–43.
187. HOVENKAMP, supra note 85, at 13–14 (noting that the distinguishing elements of the preclassical corporation were “not its structure or its ability to assemble capital” but rather its
“special contract (charter) with the state, permitting the incorporators to do something that no one
else could do”); TOMLINS, supra note 85, at 24 (describing the “decline of the corporation as a
public body and the appearance, by the end of the second decade of the nineteenth century, of a
new archetype: ‘the modern business corporation, organized to pursue private ends for individual
gain’”).
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and control.188 During the Gilded Age, the innovation of additional
legal doctrines beyond the law of corporations allowed these new
creatures to fully spread their wings: into the industrial production
process, into surrounding markets, and into a powerful and enduring
role in the polity.189
Regarding corporations’ legal status as combinations, the justification
seemed to draw in part from their prior status as creatures operating in
the public interest,190 eventually evolving into efficiency justifications
based on economies of scale and on emerging concepts of scientific
management and production.191 The selective approval of classicists
(and their immediate predecessors) for the “co-operation” embodied in
business combinations, composed of men of their own class, in contrast
to their ambivalence or hostility toward the co-operation of men and
women who contributed their physical labor to society, was widely
noted at the time.192 Herbert Hovenkamp has surveyed the comparative
treatment of business and labor combinations by Gilded Age theorists
and courts, concluding that labor combinations got the short end of the
stick for structural reasons rather than due to overt bias. 193 While a
fuller exploration will have to be saved for future work, there are
considerations that suggest that bias and structure in fact worked
together to create this result. Adam Smith (who may be presumed an at
least neutral observer) commented upon the selective disapprobation far
earlier.194 That vintage is an indication of the ancient social attitudes

188. HOVENKAMP, supra note 85, at 14–16.
189. TOMLINS, supra note 85, at 16–20 (explaining the consolidation of corporate control over
industrial production, previously controlled independently by workers or craft organizations); see
id. at 25–30 (detailing the triumph of corporate decision making over state and local regulation of
local markets).
190. TOMLINS, supra note 85, at 23.
191. See, e.g., Hovenkamp, supra note 112, at 938–40 (discussing contemporaneous
commentators’ arguments that business combinations result in increased efficiencies, lower
overall prices, and better product quality).
192. See, e.g., Francis B. Sayre, Criminal Conspiracy, 35 HARV. L. REV. 393, 420 (1922)
(“[W]hy should the law be such that if two steel workers plan a certain act which the law regards
as tortious, they should be subject to fine and imprisonment; but if, let us say, the United States
Steel Corporation plans and executes the self-same action, the criminal law should be unable to
touch it?”).
193. Hovenkamp, supra note 112, at 965 (“Labor combinations received the same treatment.
But the unique structure of the labor market—easy entry and no economies of scale—meant that
the new law had far harsher impact on labor combinations than seller cartels.”).
194. He stated:
We rarely hear, it has been said, of the combinations of masters, though frequently of
those of workmen. But whoever imagines, upon this account, that masters rarely
combine, is as ignorant of the world as of the subject. Masters are always and
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that contributed to this view. Classicists also seemed to view enhanced
business profits as a social good in a way that they did not regard wage
premiums. That, of course, is an unprincipled distinction even before
introducing normative commitments to workers’ welfare.195 It can even
be glimpsed in classicists’ sweeping statements that business
“cooperation” was necessary for social progress. For example, the same
Arthur Eddy who had urged the extension of the Sherman Act to labor
organizing had this to say:
Social progress would be impossible were if not for co-operation and
combination; therefore the law encourages and recognizes the
formation of—
1. Partnerships
2. Voluntary associations
3. Corporations
All of which are combinations in every sense of the term—a
corporation being simply the co-operation of two or more individuals
in a form of combination prescribed by law.196

Yet, in what Hovenkamp calls Eddy’s “trite apology” for business
combinations, the latter asserted that business combinations “are all in
the direction of more for less money,” while “labor unions and farmers’
organizations are all in the direction of less for more money.” It is
difficult to read Eddy’s use of “more” and “less” here as a nonperspectival view from nowhere. More, his inclusion of farmers’
organizations on the side of labor rather than business also suggests a
clear identification with a specific economic (and political) class and
associated interests, rather than some neutral distinction (assuming
everywhere in a sort of tacit, but constant and uniform, combination, not to raise the
wages of labour above their actual rate. To violate this combination is everywhere a
most unpopular action, and a sort of reproach to a master among his neighbours and
equals. We seldom, indeed, hear of this combination, because it is the usual, and, one
may say, the natural state of things, which nobody ever hears of. Masters, too,
sometimes enter into particular combinations to sink the wages of labour even below
this rate. These are always conducted with the utmost silence and secrecy till the
moment of execution.
ADAM SMITH, WEALTH OF NATIONS 60 (1776).
195. See Hovenkamp, supra note 112, at 940 (“When mainstream American political
economists around 1900 viewed business combinations, they saw increased efficiencies from
economies of scale, lower overall prices, better product quality, and higher profits.”). Note that
the inclusion of “profits” in this category is rank hypocrisy even on this outlook’s own principles,
because its analogue, higher wages, would never be seen as an independent good and in fact
would be viewed as an inefficiency. On neoclassical economic theory, too, profits (beyond what
is needed to compensate the opportunity cost of capital) are by definition inefficient.
196. EDDY, supra note 134, at 1327.
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arguendo that there is such a principle that would justify harsher
treatment for labor) between sellers of labor and sellers of other
commodities.
At any rate, as with prosecuting worker collective action under the
Sherman Act, the courts endorsed the classicist outlook on business
combinations in their construction of the Act. In United States v. JointTraffic Ass’n, “the Court . . . directly addressed” the anxiety, raised in
an earlier dissent, that the Court’s broadening of the common-law rule
on price-fixing might “carry the implication that . . . business
organizations . . . violated the Sherman Act” in themselves.197 We
might call the Court’s removal of this doubt the corporate exemption, to
parallel the labor exemption that the courts rejected.
This combination of the corporate exemption with the relative
toleration for mergers meant that business had less need to engage in
overt price-fixing. While “the government was generally more
successful in prosecuting labor unions than industrial combinations
[under the Sherman Act],” “[w]ith respect to industry, [the Act] became
moribund . . . even as corporate mergers and combinations swept the
American economy.”198 Together with the corporate exemption, this
meant that large industrial actors’ consolidation of market power was
largely unregulated: collective action that took place within a business
firm was entirely immune, while the relatively permissive attitude
toward mergers allowed firms to attain market shares that gave them
market power, often of monopolistic magnitudes. Meanwhile, workers’
attempts to act collectively in order to improve the terms of their labor
for these firms were prohibited and punished by the Act.
The bottom line is that corporations, once legally formed, were
simply not treated as combinations anymore at all, but as single units.
Not so for workers’ combinations, and certainly not so for ad hoc
workers’ combinations that came together for particular instances of
collective action. Indeed, even assuming that a particular workers’
organization were considered legal, once it struck, the law viewed the
acts as those of individuals in a combination, rather than a single unit
(in contrast to the acts of the employer, a business organization).199
197. HYLTON, supra note 13, at 94; see United States v. Joint-Traffic Ass’n, 171 U.S. 505,
567 (1898) (“[T]he formation of corporations for business or manufacturing purposes has never,
to our knowledge . . . been regarded in the nature of a contract in restraint of trade or
commerce.”).
198. BENSEL, supra note 84, at 342–43.
199. Still, at least the classicists spoke expressly of the corporation as a combination. In the
modern understanding, the concept is so entrenched that the fundamental unit in antitrust analysis
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III. THE LABOR EXEMPTION: AN UNSTABLE PARADIGM
The doctrine that the Gilded Age courts had created, applying the
Sherman Act to limit and punish worker collective action, went largely
underground during the New Deal era. There it was fertilized by the
emerging neoclassical consensus in antitrust, and was undisturbed by a
deferential labor exemption that built around it instead of uprooting it.
The labor exemption case law was a part of the New Deal paradigm
of economic regulation, and also an especially charged symbol of it.
Within the New Deal paradigm, the market society that had been
constructed during the Gilded Age in large part through cooperation
between courts and industry, now expanded to include a place for
collective bargaining by workers. Unions left the legal shadows,
becoming market actors alongside business firms. This new paradigm,
on the one hand, embraced a vision where economic life was governed
in tripartite fashion by the state, capital, and organized labor. At the
same time, it rarely articulated that vision, much less a set of underlying
principles in support of it. This was in contrast to the market
framework that it partially displaced, and with which it partially
coexisted. The theory behind antitrust policy, by contrast, was
increasingly seen as near-scientific and as transcending normative
contestation. Together, these factors resulted in a period of “normal
science” of the labor exemption.200
The law of the labor exemption thus largely ceded ideological
primacy to the market framework, even as the results it prescribed
staked out a temporary bulwark against that framework’s most extreme
and violent manifestations: carving out a place for limited economic
democracy for a limited number of working people for a limited period
of time. At the same time, it perpetuated the idea of “two rival policies”

is “the firm” (whether a corporation, partnership, or individual). The labor exemption when it
appeared at the dawn of the New Deal period only partially equalized this state of affairs, because
the parallel system for regulating labor combinations was quite onerous, and continued to
essentially impose a tradeoff upon organized labor for allowing the combination in the first place,
thus continuing to view it as a combination. In other words, while business corporations may not
combine to engage in concerted action targeting a competitor or to raise prices, a business
corporation on its own is viewed as a single actor, and thus there are no restrictions on its conduct
paralleling the restrictions contained in the NLRA. See generally TOMLINS, supra note 85.
200. I use here the notion of “normal science”—coined in THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE
OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 5 (1962), and subsequently applied in descriptions of a huge variety
of fields (science and otherwise)—to describe the period after a “paradigm shift,” when the focus
is on implementing and clarifying the new paradigm rather than on basic or first principles.
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that were fundamentally opposed. This opposition went hand in hand
with an acceptance of the basic premise that the policy of antitrust
would in fact prescribe a different result for worker collective action
than the law of the labor exemption did. The law of the labor
exemption both expressly and implicitly endorsed this premise.
A. The Norris-La Guardia Act
The text, structure, and operation of the labor exemption reinforced
both the primacy of antitrust and the supposed separateness of the
principles and values upon which labor and trade regulation,
respectively, rely. The Norris-La Guardia Act,201 one of the first pieces
of New Deal legislation, although it partially revived and then operated
together with the labor provisions of the earlier Clayton Act, came to
define the ethos of the labor exemption. The text of the Norris-La
Guardia Act does not engage directly with the framework it is
modifying, hardly articulates its own principles, and seems to be the
product of a conscious decision to so demur.
Unlike the Clayton Act, which was the first legislative attempt at a
labor exemption from antitrust,202 the Norris-La Guardia Act did not
grapple directly with trade regulation in subject matter—even with how
trade regulation applies to labor—although it had the effect of
modifying its reach. Norris-La Guardia is not an antitrust statute.
Instead, it is incorporated into Title 29 (“Labor”) of the United States
Code. By contrast, the Clayton Act was conceived and written as an
antitrust statute, was incorporated into Title 15, the antitrust and trade
regulation section of the Code, and portions of it dealt with matters
other than labor.
201. Act of Mar. 23, 1932, ch. 90, 47 Stat. 70 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 101–115
(2012)).
202. Act of Oct. 15, 1914, ch. 323, § 1, 38 Stat. 730, 730 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §
12 (2012)). Section 20 of the Clayton Act had limited the availability of injunctions in disputes
relating to the terms and conditions of employment. Id. § 2, 38 Stat. at 738 (codified as amended
at U.S.C. § 52). Those provisions were nearly laid flat by the pre-Roosevelt Supreme Court in
Duplex Printing Co. v. Deering, which held that the union’s objective (a closed shop) and method
(secondary boycott) were illegitimate, and thus fell outside the statute (thus also creating an
opening for courts to import additional extra-statutory understandings of legitimate objectives and
methods back on the part of working people). 254 U.S. 443, 477–78 (1921). United States v.
Hutcheson (discussed for other purposes, infra) revived section 20 by reading the Clayton Act in
conjunction with Norris-La Guardia, holding that together they protected the enumerated
activities from both injunctions and actions for damages. 312 U.S. 210, 211 (1940).
Interestingly, Duplex Printing on its face did not hold that a strike for higher wages would be an
illegitimate activity and thus would not be protected by the labor exemption. This reflects the fact
that the courts of this period were still not consistently applying neoclassicist analysis, under
which such an action would be classic price-fixing—assuming antitrust applies to labor.
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In content, Norris-La Guardia also does not deal directly with the
subject matter, provisions, or logic of trade regulation. Its text does not
include any reference to antitrust or to the Sherman Act, nor to the
subject matter of its provisions.203 Norris-La Guardia’s central edict is
the following:
No court of the United States, as defined in this chapter, as defined in
this chapter, shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or
temporary or permanent injunction in a case involving or growing out
of a labor dispute, except in a strict conformity with the provisions of
this chapter; nor shall any such restraining order or temporary or
permanent injunction be issued contrary to the public policy declared
in this chapter.204

The statute then goes on to enumerate acts, involving or growing out
of a labor dispute, that a court may not enjoin,205 and to set out the
conditions that shall define “involving or growing out of a labor
dispute.”206 Nowhere does it refer to restraints of trade or to
monopolies—the central subjects of the Sherman Act—or attempt to
redefine them as they relate to labor.207 Again, by contrast, the Clayton
Act famously asserted: “[T]he labor of a human being is not a
commodity or an article of commerce.”208 That proposition directly and
203. The only section in which it even approaches the subject matter of antitrust is when it
states, derivatively of its central provisions:
No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue a restraining order or
temporary or permanent injunction upon the ground that any of the persons
participating or interested in a labor dispute constitute or are engaged in an unlawful
combination or conspiracy because of the doing in concert of the acts enumerated in
section 104 of this title.
Act of Mar. 23, 1932, ch. 90, § 5, 47 Stat. at 71 (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 105) (emphasis
added). Even this speaks more to common-law conspiracy than antitrust, for the latter is specific
about its subject matter—restraint of trade—unlike the common law, which could relate to any
illegal act or predicate.
204. Id. § 1, 47 Stat. at 70 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 101).
205. Id. § 4, 47 Stat. at 70 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 104).
206. Id. § 13, 47 Stat. at 73 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 113 (a), (b), and (c)).
207. This is not entirely surprising, in that Norris-La Guardia was aimed not just at antitrust,
but more generally at what was then often called the “government by injunction” legislated by
Gilded Age courts in the domain of labor. In this, the courts had used antitrust, to be sure, but
also the old common-law concepts of conspiracy and property interests of the employer, to justify
blanket injunctions against worker collective action. Yet, as to either theory of liability, the Act
was equally pragmatic and results-focused in approach. There is simply less reason to comment
on its failure to grapple with the property-based common-law bases for liability because those,
unlike the Sherman Act, are no longer used (although, as I argued in Part II, supra, their vestiges
may live in the Sherman Act, and others have argued that their vestiges live in statutory labor
regulation as well).
208. Act of Oct. 15, 1914, ch. 323, § 6, 38 Stat. 730, 731 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
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forthrightly challenged antitrust law’s application to labor, for if labor is
not a commodity, then it is nonsensical to speak of restraining trade in it
or of fixing prices in it. The Norris-La Guardia Act offered no
analogous rationale for its limitations of the effect of antitrust regulation
upon labor.
William Forbath described the momentum that fueled the Norris-La
Guardia Act in two stages: the first, dominated by the more oldfashioned “rights talk” of the trade unionists, and the second, which
resulted in the bill that was actually passed, dominated by the ascendant
Progressive architects of the New Deal, notably Felix Frankfurter.209
Forbath’s emphasis is on the degree to which these two approaches
were laissez-faire or statist: distrustful of the government’s involvement
in labor matters (the first, union-dominated phase) or optimistic about
its possibilities (the second, Frankfurter-dominated phase). Another
difference, implicit in his account, is the extent to which the two
approaches met the theory of liability that they challenged head on, in a
clash of principles (the first phase), or opted for a more pragmatic,
results-oriented approach (the second phase).210 The approach that won
out was the pragmatic, results-oriented statutory text just discussed.
Saving the statute from constitutional scrutiny may have been the most
pragmatic course at the time,211 but the manner of doing so also set the
tone for the “normal science” period of the statute to follow. Although
Norris-La Guardia revived Clayton’s labor provision, it imposed the

§ 17 (2012)). It also stated:
The labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce. Nothing
contained in the antitrust laws shall be construed to forbid the existence and operation
of labor, agricultural, or horticultural organizations, instituted for the purposes of
mutual help, and not having capital stock or conducted for profit, or to forbid or
restrain individual members of such organizations from lawfully carrying out the
legitimate objects thereof; nor shall such organizations, or the members thereof, be
held or construed to be illegal combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade, under
the antitrust laws.
Id.
209. More generally, the second version of the legislation was associated with “the men and
women who after 1932 became ‘New Deal attorneys’ and the builders of a ‘new American
state,’” a community of which Frankfurter was emblematic and, in a basic sense, helped to create.
FORBATH, supra note 20, at 165.
210. Forbath notes that “the vocabulary of Marx’s Capital finds a strange echo in the words of
‘pure and simple trade unionist’ [Andrew] Furuseth,” as he testified before Congress: “Now, if
you are going to permit this kind of expansion of the word ‘property’ to cover every human
relation, you set up a condition, gentlemen, under which the creator, the human being who
through his creative power . . . has created certain property, you make that man fall down on his
knees and worship what he himself has produced.’” Id. at 161 (internal citations omitted).
211. Id. at 164.
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cost of replacing its “rights talk” with its own pragmatic ethos. We see
this in the labor exemption case law, which displays a general
orientation toward effects over principle, and which in turn enabled the
implicit primacy of antitrust policy over labor policy.
B. Solidification of the Paradigm
The transitional and foundational cases that came to define the
normal science period showed no signs of reviving the rights talk of an
earlier wave of challenges to the operation of the market society.
Instead, these pivotal, paradigm-solidifying cases largely endorsed the
primacy of antitrust, and reinforced the premise that absent a labor
exemption, antitrust would regulate and often bar worker collective
action.
1. Apex Hosiery
Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader,212 decided by a very different Supreme
Court than the one that had decided the key pre-New Deal precedents,
came close to being something other than what it was. It is the sole
decision that approached the proposition that the Sherman Act, on its
own terms, does not apply to a large swath of worker collective action,
and that is not an entirely unreasonable reading of the opinion.213 Yet a
closer reading shows that the opinion actually affirmed the default
applicability of antitrust law to worker collective action, failing some
specific exception, and in so doing ratified its primacy. Moreover, the
reasoning for carving out the exception again relied upon the
affirmative New Deal labor legislation that had just passed and
incorporated its limits.
The Court began by expressly rejecting the proposition that the
Sherman Act does not apply to the concerted actions of workers to
improve their wages and working conditions. Particularly notable are
the grounds it gave for doing so: “On the contrary Congress has
repeatedly enacted laws restricting or purporting to curtail the
application of the Act to labor organizations and their activities, thus
recognizing that to some extent not defined they remain subject to
it.”214

212. 310 U.S. 469 (1940).
213. See Susan Schwochau, The Labor Exemptions to Antitrust Law: An Overview, 21 J. LAB.
RES. 535, 542 (2000) (stating Apex Hosiery “rested not on any statutory labor exemption, but on
construction of the Sherman Act itself”).
214. Apex Hosiery, 310 U.S. at 488.
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Here the Court expressly stated the point I have been urging
regarding the development of the labor exemption and the default
assumptions that it embedded in the law regarding the intersection of
trade regulation and labor regulation: that the judicial construction of
the Sherman Act in the classicist period, as applying to worker
collective action, was actually preserved as the underlying rule even in
the New Deal period, although its effects were greatly curtailed.
Having held that the activities of combinations of workers to better
their terms of work are by default “subject to” antitrust regulation and
prosecution, the Court then went on to hold that the particular acts in
front of it were not antitrust violations. Specifically, the Court held that
taking labor costs out of price competition was not a violation of the
Sherman Act:
[S]uccessful union activity, as for example consummation of a wage
agreement with employers, may have some influence on price
competition by eliminating that part of such competition which is
based on differences in labor standards. Since, in order to render a
labor combination effective it must eliminate the competition from
non-union made goods . . . an elimination of price competition based
on differences in labor standards is the objective of any national labor
organization. But this effect on competition has not been considered
to be the kind of curtailment of price competition prohibited by the
Sherman Act.215

The opinion then immediately cited the recent New Deal labor
legislation, offered in support of the proposition that legislative intent
behind the Sherman Act was not to proscribe worker collective
action.216 The Court thus relied upon the affirmative labor legislation
recently passed for its conclusion that the effect of worker collective
action on price competition—perhaps the core issue—does not render
that concerted action barred by antitrust. Sound reasoning or not, this
rendered the Court’s holding apparently dependent upon that new labor
policy, particularly given that it already stated that worker collective
action is by default subject to antitrust. Relatedly, and underscoring the
same point, instead of overruling or disapproving of Loewe v. Lawlor,
or any of the other classicist antitrust cases punishing worker collective
action, Apex Hosiery distinguished them, another tacit endorsement of
their basic logic. It distinguished them on the basis that the case before

215. Id. at 503–04.
216. Id. at 504 n.24 (citing Norris-La Guardia, but also the Wagner Act and the Fair Labor
Standards Act).
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it did not involve secondary action, which had been prohibited because
of the nature of the means rather than the nature of its effects, 217 not
because their effects on price competition were economically
distinguishable.
All this has two immediate implications. First, it cedes significant
ground to the emerging neoclassical antitrust framework by tacitly
suggesting that there is no other reason why it ought not to apply—that
but for a separately articulated statutory labor policy, there is indeed and
ought to be a market for labor in all pertinent respects analogous to the
market for products, justifying the same antitrust treatment for
concerted action. The Court did not offer a meaningful principled
alternative to the neoclassical economic perspective that was coming to
define antitrust.
Second, the construction of the relationship between antitrust and one
of the key objects of worker collective action was thus expressly limited
by the New Deal labor framework’s thresholds of applicability: legally,
employee status; and many times practically, the existence of a labor
organization formed according to a complicated bureaucratic structure
that would only become more complex and restrictive as the century
wore on. Those limitations are highlighted in today’s deregulation
economy, in which those thresholds are increasingly absent. Thus, even
if the Court’s holding can be understood to construct the Sherman Act
alone, its statement of that holding plainly limits that construction to
limits placed by New Deal labor legislation. Workers who fall outside
the category “employee” are the most obvious evidence of the limits
that have inhered in the law the entire time, but they may be figurative
canaries in the coal mine.
The greatest immediate legacy of Apex Hosiery, meanwhile, was its
elevation of the distinction between labor markets and product markets
(and whether a restraint in the labor market has a “substantial effect” in
the product market), in the law of the labor exemption. 218 This suggests
a caveat to the reading I have offered, for the distinction between labor
markets and product markets and its mention of the Clayton Act
together may be read as a suggestion that the Court did, to some extent,
endorse a basic distinction between the selling of labor and the selling
of commodities. Yet in light of the entire opinion, in particular its

217. Id. at 505–06.
218. This left future courts to determine how close the connection to the product market must
be, for the act by the labor union to be within the ambit of the Sherman Act. Schwochau, supra
note 213, at 543.
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reliance on affirmative labor legislation and its failure to articulate any
principle for the distinction, this is best read as a minor strain.
2. Hutcheson
That minor strain dissolved into a road not taken with United States
v. Hutcheson.219 Even more directly than Apex Hosiery, the Hutcheson
decision relied upon the Norris-La Guardia and Clayton Acts, regarding
those together with the Sherman Act as a set of “interlacing statutes.”220
Hutcheson read the Clayton Act’s proclamation that that certain
activities by combinations of workers “shall not be considered or held to
be violations of any law” in combination with Norris-La Guardia’s list
of enumerated activities protected from injunction, essentially
expanding that shield to immunize against not only requests for
injunctive relief but actions for damages as well. Hutcheson’s holding
was broad and was a boon to the labor movement. But despite its
partial resuscitation of the Clayton Act, it ignored the minor strain in
Apex Hosiery, and relied expressly on the statutorily defined labor
exemption. Instead of focusing on the distinction between the labor
market and the product market, it “focused on the activities of labor
organizations (due to the language of Clayton) and whether those
activities fell within the class of activities exempted by Norris-La
Guardia.”221 Because “future cases employed the Hutcheson line
almost exclusively,”222 this removed any vestige of the concept that
labor is not and ought not be treated as a commodity from the main
thrust of the labor exemption case law, and redoubled focus upon
construction of a list of exempted activities, for which no real principle
had been offered in the statute nor in the decision.
One reason Hutcheson had such immediate practical significance is
that it removed the uncertainty left in the wake of Apex Hosiery
regarding secondary actions by workers—“solidarity actions” (without
which organized labor likely would not have amassed the political
power necessary to pass New Deal labor legislation in the first
place).223 This also may supply the explanation for why Hutcheson
219. 312 U.S. 219 (1941).
220. Id. at 232.
221. Schwochau, supra note 213, at 544; Hutcheson, 312 U.S. at 234 (reading the Clayton and
Norris-La Guardia Acts together, to hold that the “bounds of a labor dispute” included, and
therefore exempted, secondary action).
222. Schwochau, supra note 213, at 544 (citing PHILIP AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP,
ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION (1997)).
223. Despite the draconian character of the official pre-New Deal precedent regarding
antitrust and worker collective action, much worker collective action including secondary action
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sidestepped the minor strain in Apex Hosiery and redoubled the focus on
the affirmative statutory basis for an exemption. For Apex Hosiery had
affirmed the general principle that the Sherman Act applied to worker
collective action, relying largely upon the old cases, and then
distinguished those cases on the basis that they involved secondary
action. Thus, Hutcheson had to find some other basis for freeing
secondary action from antitrust liability, and without overruling Apex
Hosiery’s construction of the Sherman Act, it did so by holding that
regardless of what the Sherman Act meant, the statutory labor
exemption immunized secondary action.
C. The Normal Science of the Labor Exemption
The normal science of the labor exemption framework solidified the
suggestions in the foundational case law, largely adopting the relatively
contingent threshold conditions of affirmative labor regulation rather
than relying upon a principled distinction between labor markets and
product markets (or some other principle), to define its boundary with
antitrust. This fed grumblings about the special treatment accorded
labor. It also led naturally to the result that independent contractor
workers were subjected to antitrust liability, even while courts seemed
to acknowledge their underlying status as workers.
1. Generally
Because Hutcheson, not Apex Hosiery, was largely the basis for the
normal science of the labor exemption, the exemption was largely
defined by the list of exempted activities set out in Norris-La Guardia.
The main body of labor exemption case law tended to ignore the minor
strain in Apex Hosiery, which may have been suggestive of a principled
distinction between labor markets and product markets on the Sherman
Act’s own terms. The normal science of the labor exemption was
instead mostly concerned with policing the boundaries of the exempted
activities, and of the category of traditional activities of labor unions.
The normal science of the labor exemption was also defined to a
great extent by its context, namely a basic economic policy of cogovernance by capital, the state, and labor. The trucking industry was
an excellent example of this, with the Interstate Commerce Commission
(“ICC”) effectively setting rates in cooperation with industry and with

did as a matter of fact take place, sometimes escaping the iron fist of the judiciary and sometimes
provoking overt repression; this did in fact contribute to labor’s power, both economic and
political. FORBATH, supra note 20, at 141–47.
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the Teamsters, the labor organization that represented a critical mass of
truck drivers in the mid-twentieth-century period.224
At the same time, the contemporaneous scholarly and policy
commentary focused to a great degree upon the labor exemption as a
symbol of a basic contest about economic worldviews that the New
Deal era had not resolved, consisting as it did of a marriage between the
official ideology of the market society with the actual practice of
economic life.225 In a mid-century article that provides a window into
this commentary, antitrust scholar Ralph Winter noted the “irrational”
primacy of the labor exemption in the contemporaneous “debates over
labor policy,” describing it (and the potential application of the Sherman
Act to labor) as an “emotional symbol” of the clash of policies and
perhaps worldviews.226 This description furnishes a clear contrast with
the present day, where the labor exemption has been largely consigned
to an arcane specialty practiced by a tiny subset of lawyers and receives
little attention from scholars and almost none in the broader policy
discourse. This is partly because the juice that was fueling that
emotional symbolism was the challenge, however attenuated, that New
Deal practice posed to official market ideology.
If the labor exemption itself had irrational primacy in policy debates
in the mid-century period,227 then the supposed conflict between
antitrust policy and labor policy was almost always a presupposition of
those debates.228 That presupposition was harmonious with the position
of industry, which was that the conflict was acute and that labor’s
exemption from it was absolute and unprincipled, resulting in
deleterious economic effects of significant magnitude.229

224. BELZER, supra note 33, at 55.
225. Id.
226. Winter, supra note 15, at 16.
227. The U.S. 1961–62 Intercollegiate Debate had as its topic: “Resolved: That Labor
Organizations Should Be Under the Jurisdiction of Antitrust Legislation.” LABOR & ANTI-TRUST
LEGISLATION 1 (Harold S. Roberts ed., 1961); see also Comment, The Antitrust Laws and Labor,
30 FORDHAM L. REV. 759, 759 n. 1 (1962).
228. See, e.g., Bernard D. Meltzer, Labor Unions, Collective Bargaining, and the Antitrust
Laws, 6 J.L. & ECON. 152, 152 (1963) (positing a tension between national labor policies and the
objectives of antitrust laws); see also ANTON G.O. SMITSENDONK, TRADE AND LABOR: TWO
AMERICAN POLICIES 81–86 (1971) (same).
229. See, e.g., Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs., Organized Labor and the Antitrust Laws—Industry’s
View, in LABOR & ANTI-TRUST LEGISLATION, supra note 227, at 71 (“[I]t is a matter of timely
information that a double standard exists in the application of the antitrust laws—one under
which business monopoly is prohibited, and the other under which union monopolistic practices
are freed of restraint.”).
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2. Normal Science Case Law and “Independent Contractor” Workers
The prior statement, in Part I, that the labor exemption is receding
through the mechanism of the independent contractor form, can now be
restated as follows: the normal science labor exemption largely has no
space for the newly ascendant forms of the labor relationship in the
current period of breakdown—forms outside the category “employee.”
The normal science case law also assumes as a factual matter the
centrality and strength of labor organizations engaged in NLRA-based
collective bargaining. Both ways, it is primarily focused on borderfixing issues. The border defined by employee status was, as set out
supra, imported into the labor exemption case law by the reliance upon
the larger set of affirmative labor legislation of which Norris-La
Guardia was a part. The inevitable implications were then drawn out in
the first cases dealing with independent contractor workers and the
labor exemption.
Taylor v. Local No. 7230 made the implications of Hutcheson and
Apex Hosiery for workers outside the category “employee” concrete and
explicit.231 In other words, it manifested the implications of the resultsfocused reliance upon employee status embodied by Norris-La Guardia
and the foundational case law, over the more principled distinction
between labor and commodity earlier promised in the Clayton Act. The
latter distinction may have saved the conduct punished in Taylor, while
the former did not. The distinction between the two roads is especially
dramatized by the court’s recognition, in Taylor, of the independent
contractors as occupying the social and economic space of workers. In
this, they retained some of the pre-New Deal consciousness of who
workers are apart from the “employee” label even as they apply the new
legal demarcation to decide whether workers’ collective action will be
saved from antitrust.
230. 353 F.2d 593 (4th Cir. 1965).
231. The U.S. Supreme Court’s very brief opinion in Columbia River Packers Ass’n v.
Hinton, 315 U.S. 143 (1942), actually preceded Hutcheson and just followed Apex Hosiery. It
held that a fisherman’s union (affiliated with the CIO) was an organization of independent
businessmen and sellers of commodities, not employees, and moreover, that the employment
relationship was not the matrix of the controversy. Id. at 147. Thus, the fishermen’s collective
refusal to sell to a particular dealer was not protected by the labor exemption. Id. The fishermen
may have been among the earliest casualties of the presumption of antitrust liability solidified by
the New Deal labor exemption. I choose to discuss Taylor in greater detail for two related
reasons. First, it is a clearer illustration of the actual boundary of the labor exemption, because
Columbia River Packers Ass’n at least involved sellers of a physical commodity rather than the
sellers of pure labor or services. Second, Taylor demarcates that narrower boundary after the dust
had settled from the initial, defining labor exemption decisions, rather than while the ground was
shifting.
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Taylor applied the framework created by Hutcheson in applying the
labor exemption to antitrust:
[I]t is well settled that provisions of the Sherman, Clayton and NorrisLa[]Guardia Acts must be considered together in determining the
scope of the exemption of union activities from the antitrust
provisions; and, in the light of such consideration, the test to be
applied in determining whether such activities are exempt is whether
they present a case which can be said to involve or grow out of a
“labor dispute.”232

The court went on to adopt the suggestion of Milk Wagon Drivers233
and Columbia River Packers Ass’n234 taken together, that unless either
the parties stood in the relationship of employer and employee or the
employment relationship was the “matrix of the controversy,” the labor
exemption could not protect their conduct from antitrust liability.235
Taylor engaged in a lengthy inquiry about whether the defendant
horseshoers were in fact employees or independent contractors,
concluding that because they were independent contractors, their
concerted action was subject to prosecution.236
Taylor thus extends the rule that Columbia Rivers Packers Ass’n had
formulated for “sellers of commodities” to individuals whom the court
itself plainly considers workers. Unlike the earlier Supreme Court case,
the Taylor court never used such words as “sellers of commodities.”
Indeed, the term “independent contractor” itself is suggestive of the fact
that the individual is primarily selling labor, not some physical fruit of
labor. The court certainly spoke as if it considers them workers,
importing its social understanding of work:
Pressures of economic necessity to work in order to provide for one’s
family and to accommodate the needs of the person who is paying for
232. Taylor, 353 F.2d at 602.
233. Milk Wagon Drivers’ Union Local No. 753 v. Lake Valley Farm Prods., Inc., 311 U.S.
91 (1940).
234. 315 U.S. 143.
235. Taylor, 353 F.2d at 604–05. Milk Wagon Drivers held that disputes in which individuals
engage in collective action can be immunized by the labor exemption if the employment
relationship is the matrix of the dispute, even where the employment relationship at issue is
someone else’s—thus effectively protecting secondary action, either in solidarity with other
workers or targeting actors who do business with one’s employer. Milk Wagon Drivers, 311 U.S.
at 99–100; see also New Negro All. v. Sanitary Grocery Co., 303 U.S. 552, 560 (1938) (using the
same reasoning to immunize a consumer boycott, aimed at employment practices, under the labor
exemption). Interestingly, this minor strain of jurisprudence, which has not been overruled,
preserves an option for non-employee workers that has long since been closed off under the
NLRA.
236. Taylor, 353 F.2d at 597–600.
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the services are applicable to every person engaged in a trade, calling
or profession for gain and are not relevant considerations in
determining whether one is an employee or an independent contractor.
It goes without saying that independent contractors, as well as
employees, must work to support themselves and their families and
must make themselves available to render services at such times as
they are needed.237

The relevant distinction was at this point definitively not between
“labor” and “commodity” (a possibility that the Clayton Act held out),
but between workers who are “employees” and “independent
contractors” (not even simply between those who are “employees” or
not). The court engaged in no discussion of what policy might be
served by drawing the demarcation thus, but it certainly does import its
own social understanding of how workers are supposed to
“accommodate” the “needs” of those they are “serv[ing],” by “making
themselves available to them.” It clearly identified these “independent
contractors” as “persons” engaged in “work,” in a “trade, calling, or
profession.” While one response to the suggestion of this Article may
be that it is too difficult to draw the line between non-employees who
are workers and those who are not for purposes of antitrust liability,
Taylor demonstrates both that there is a fairly strong collective intuition
(including on the part of conservative, pro-market courts) that such a
category exists, and that it is not impossible to determine who is in it.
The normal science case law as to independent contractor workers
was generally in accord with Taylor,238 while providing for some
exceptions to the general rule that worker collective action was
completely barred by antitrust.
The exceptions are of limited
application to the problem at hand. First, a limited exception, based on
American Federation of Musicians v. Carroll239 and its progeny, allows
collective bargaining on behalf of independent contractor workers in
certain circumstances. The Carroll exception applies only where an
established labor organization already represents a critical mass of
employees in the workplace or sector, and is grounded in those other

237. Id. at 597 (emphases added).
238. See, e.g., L.A. Meat & Provisions Drivers Union, Local 626 v. United States, 371 U.S.
94, 104 (1962) (antitrust barred independent contractor drivers from union membership); Spence
v. Se. Alaska Pilots’ Ass’n, 789 F. Supp. 1007, 1011 (D. Alaska 1990) (union of independent
contractor pilots impermissible under antitrust).
239. 391 U.S. 99 (1968); see also H.A. Artists & Assocs. v. Actors’ Equity Ass’n, 451 U.S.
704 (1981) (allowing collective-bargaining agreements that stage actors and actresses,
independent contractors, entered into with major theatrical producers).
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workers’ statutorily recognized interest in effective bargaining (not in
the independent contractor workers’ interests). The relevance of
Carroll is profoundly limited for today’s independent contractor
workers, in that traditional labor organizations have little density in the
industries in which such workers labor. This exception is also aimed at
the “nonstatutory,” collective bargaining aspect of the exemption, rather
than at unilateral worker collective action. The second primary
exception, based on the earlier Milk Wagon Drivers case, does reach
unilateral collective action, but generally only protects independent
contractor workers who are organizing specifically toward employee
status, not those who are engaging in concerted action to directly better
their conditions, or for other purposes.240
IV. ANTITRUST LIABILITY FOR WORKER COLLECTIVE ACTION: THE VERY
IDEA
As we already saw, the New Deal put a fairly abrupt stop to the use
of antitrust law to quash most collective worker action in the manner
that had been opened up by Workingmen’s Amalgamated and the
Danbury Hatters case. But as we also saw, the fundamental proposition
that the internal logic of antitrust law required worker collective action
to be subject to liability remained in the deep structure of the law, a
legacy of those early cases. Modern antitrust law thus directly inherited
that proposition from Gilded Age courts, which expressly relied on a
specific conception of the social good (one we would not now accept) to
justify it. At the same time, the ideology associated with modern
antitrust created increasingly rigid divisions between the economic
sphere of life and other spheres, notably the social and political spheres.
In this final Part, I examine the maintenance of this underlying
assumption in the present era as one contingent policy decision among
many, which together constitute actual markets. Maintaining the
underlying rule involves normative commitments: making those explicit
will allow us to decide whether they can be improved.

240. Milk Wagon Drivers, 311 U.S. at 102–03. The exception is further described in note 235,
supra. Note, further, that organizing specifically for improved wages and working conditions
ought to be within the scope of this exception, so long as employee status is also among the aims
(under the test that the dispute must relate to terms and conditions of employment).
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A. The Inherent Normative Content of Punishing Worker Collective
Action Under Antitrust
The modern justification for punishing worker collective action
through antitrust law, no less than the classicist one and no less than a
policy of exempting worker collective action, rests on specific
normative judgments that are neither politically neutral nor selfevident.241 The difference is that while the classicists were relatively
overt and direct in their appeals to a specific conception of the social
good—one which entailed a hierarchical suppression of workers’
agency in service of constructing a new market—in modern antitrust
law that category of consideration (to say nothing of appeals to social
hierarchy specifically) has gone largely underground.
Antitrust law enshrines the ideals of the market society—
competition, open markets, and prices that are determined accordingly
—and seemingly reinforces the idea of a “singular ideal type of
market.”242 At the same time, it embodies the proposition that those
ideals require affirmative state action for their realization: state policies
that encourage “pro-competitive” conduct by commercial actors and
discourage “anti-competitive” conduct.
Antitrust law itself, leaving aside how it plays out in the price-fixing
or boycott doctrine or its application to labor, is thus an embodiment of
the fact that the market society is not some “natural” or default state of
affairs but, on the contrary, the product of an affirmative and often
costly set of policy decisions on the part of the state itself. 243 Today,
competition is something that courts undertake to promote, and various
241. This argument, which I make here with respect to its relationship to labor, has been
widely made with regard to modern antitrust law generally. See, e.g., Michael S. Jacobs, An
Essay on the Normative Foundations of Antitrust Economics, 74 N.C. L. Rev. 219, 226 (1995)
(arguing that “the contemporary debate between antitrust economists demonstrates how efforts to
base antitrust policy solely upon economic theory inevitably draw on political assumptions about
the marketplace”; that “inconclusive evidence of the efficiency effects of many business
practices, and the inability of economic theory to determine which model promises greater
efficiency, expose these political assumptions and effectively transform the economics debate
into a political one”; and that “antitrust discourse would benefit from the acknowledgment by
policymakers that the current economic debate is theoretically and empirically irresolvable, and
from their express recognition that the choice between conflicting economic models constitutes a
normative ordering of divergent political beliefs”).
242. Frank Dobbin & Timothy J. Dowd, The Market that Antitrust Built: Public Policy,
Private Coercion, and Railroad Acquisitions, 1825 to 1922, 65 AM. SOC. REV. 631, 631 (2000).
243. Id. (“In economic sociology, an emergent camp contends that antitrust and other policies
actively constitute market characteristics. These sociologists suggest that markets may take a
variety of different forms rather than conforming to a singular ideal type, and that antitrust policy
contributes to this variety rather than serving merely to correct markets that have strayed from the
ideal type.”).
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policies and practices by private actors are to be evaluated specifically
according to whether they promote competition. This is truly a far cry
from the original classicist position on markets, according to which
almost anything a private actor did in furtherance of interest was, ipso
facto, competition. The very idea that competition is a normative ideal
separate from what firms actually do in furtherance of their economic
self-interest makes space for affirmative state intervention (to bring
affairs closer to that normative ideal). To be sure, the classicists had a
notion of legitimate and illegitimate competition, but that distinction
was drawn on the basis of moral or normative concepts distinct from
competition itself.
In the neoclassical framework, by contrast,
competition itself is the normative benchmark used by antitrust. In
other words, the classical framework put bounds on the acts of market
actors, but on the basis of conflict between competition and other
normative ideals. The neoclassical framework bounds the acts of
market actors on the basis of ideal of competition itself. That fact
betrays the irreducible normative content of the concept of competition
as it is used by contemporary courts, over and above the content of the
concept of competition employed by classicist courts.
The law of price-fixing is about preventing restraints on competition,
or coordinated conduct that tends to have anti-competitive effects. The
reason that I say there is an irreducible normative component in its
application is that some restraints on competition are always present in a
market; they function as the walls within which competition will take
place. At the most basic level, these include all sorts of commercial
regulation such as the rules defining and legally constituting the entities
that will engage in competition, as well as industry-specific regulation.
The goal of “maximizing competition” is simply not tenable, as a
practical and logical matter, without incorporating some kind of limits.
Then it is an unavoidable question what those appropriate limits,
embodied for example in the scope of the price-fixing law, are. The
limits we actually have are arguably as much the result of historical
accident as they are of rational economic science. Thus, the logic of
price-fixing has an inherent openness or indeterminacy, such that
effectively extrinsic normative considerations are necessary to
determine the precise circumstances under which concerted action to
constrict supply of a given commodity is prohibited by antitrust law.
The role these considerations play is rarely overt; courts typically fold
them under the concepts of “maximizing competition” or “legitimate
competition.”
This is particularly so with respect to antitrust’s relationship to labor,
which was formed under the pressure of normative considerations that
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would likely not be endorsed openly by today’s courts. That
relationship raises a set of normative questions no matter how it is
constituted—not only if labor is exempted from antitrust prosecution.
One can imagine a whole variety of arrangements relating antitrust law
to labor—from total subjection of worker collective action to pricefixing, treating each worker as an individual firm, and with no labor
exemption whatsoever, on one end; to a complete exemption for
workers’ organizations with no restrictions, on the other. Any of these
arrangements would then simply become background legal facts; they
would constitute the markets within which economic interactions take
place.
B. Doctrinal Fault Lines
In particular cases, courts make judgments about what circumstances
define a commodity’s market price, and about whether some exception
to the centrality of that normative ideal applies. Courts engaging in
neoclassical antitrust analysis make affirmative normative judgments—
whether overtly or implicitly—that are indispensable to their decision to
continue to punish worker collective action by means of antitrust law.
In this final Section, I explore the ways in which these normative
considerations interact with the malleable logic of price-fixing, within
three doctrinal pathways: (1) the wayward meaning of price-fixing
itself, particularly in contexts that have direct implications for the
regulation of worker collective action; (2) the operation of the
“professional privilege” to shield certain types of workers and small
producers from antitrust liability for concerted action; and (3) the basis
on which First Amendment protection is denied to concerted action by
workers unshielded by the labor exemption.
1. The Wayward Meaning of Price-Fixing
“The statement ‘price-fixing is per se illegal’ is easy to say, but it
immediately raises the problem of defining price-fixing.”244 While one
might make the equivalent remark about any legal rule, it is no accident
that the price-fixing doctrine draws it. The meaning of price-fixing, and
with it the rule, has taken wide pendulum swings over the course of the
twentieth century, and the relative consolidation of a neoclassical
consensus in the last quarter of that century has in some sense contained
the seed of its own unraveling, opening the latest door for courts to take
the broader perspective urged in this Article.
244. HYLTON, supra note 13, at 117.
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The “per se rule” is that certain activities are violations of the
Sherman Act regardless of their actual effects on competition in the
market (and to a certain extent regardless of intent). The (modern)
rationale is one of judicial and administrative economy: rather than
tallying all the market effects in a particular case, some types of conduct
are considered likely enough to be anti-competitive that they are
deemed violations of the Sherman Act without requiring the plaintiff (or
agency) to prove up the anti-competitive effects. As courts consider
new varieties of potential violations, more activities are incorporated
into the per se rule, while certain categories of conduct (and new
categories of conduct) remain subject to the “rule of reason.”
The per se rule as to price-fixing itself was a stark departure from the
common law, which probably enforced certain agreements that would
now be considered criminal price-fixing.245 The rule was narrowly
established early on in the Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n case.246 In
Standard Oil, the Supreme Court moved away from the per se rule, and
partially reinstated a reasonableness test even for express rate-setting
agreements, encompassing considerations such as the purpose, power of
the parties, and actual effects of the agreement.247 In Chicago Board of
Trade, the Court again rejected the per se rule and made a distinction
between restraints that “merely regulate and perhaps thereby promote
competition” and those that “may suppress or even destroy
competition.”248 This represented a halfway point between the
common-law rule (a full-blown rule of reason, where even express
restraints of trade could be valid if social benefits outweighed harms)
and the per se rule, by creating the category of “regulating and
promoting” competition. In its initial form, the rule was probably closer

245. The reason is that not only was price-fixing not a tort or crime under the common law, as
already stated in Part II, supra, but also that the definition of price-fixing was very different:
common-law courts expressly took into account not only whether the resultant prices were
reasonable, but whether the competition-restricting agreement’s net social effect was positive:
whether the “net effect, taking into account possible consumer benefits, is probably harmful to the
public.” Id. at 93. This is in contrast to neoclassical price-fixing cases that expressly disavowed
potential offsetting consumer benefits, not to mention potential “non-economic” social benefits.
246. Id. at 90–94. See generally United States v. Trans-Mo. Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290,
372–73 (1897) (rejecting the common-law reasonableness standard and refusing to consider the
defendants’ argument that the prices set were reasonable, apparently implying that contracts in
restraint of trade might be reasonable overall).
247. See generally Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911) (replacing the per se
test with a reasonableness test); HYLTON, supra note 13, at 101–02 (discussing the decision in
Standard Oil).
248. Chi. Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918); see also HYLTON, supra
note 13, at 104–06 (discussing the decision in Chicago Board of Trade).
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to the broad common-law rule of reason; it evolved considerably away
from that as neoclassicism took greater hold. Chicago Board of
Trade—unlike some other cases from the period that took the rule
further—actually remains good law. The battle has been in applying the
rule, in particular regarding the definition of “pro-competitive” and
regarding the distinction between regulating competition in a manner
that enables it (permissible) and restricts it (impermissible).
Especially instructive is Appalachian Coals,249 which extended
Chicago Board of Trade almost back to the common-law rule of reason
analysis, holding that price-fixing does not intrinsically violate the
Sherman Act if the benefits outweigh the harms, and taking a fairly
broad view of the category of benefits that may be considered.
Although not a labor case, the reasoning and facts of Appalachian Coals
are of particular relevance to labor markets. The Court’s reasoning was
that in a market characterized by large, organized buyers that “created
monopsonistic conditions on the demand side, depressing market
prices,” an agreement to reduce or eliminate competition may be
permissible.250 The Court cited several manifestations of “destructive
competition” obtaining in the market for bituminous coal prior to the
agreement between the sellers, all of them flowing from these
monopsonistic conditions.251 This, of course, is the situation of many
labor markets, particularly heightened by destructive competition on the
product market side.252
This doctrinal uncertainty was connected with and reflected the
ideological and policy ambiguity already mentioned regarding the
economic vision and policy of the New Deal era. Overall, the market
framework seemed to retain the upper hand ideologically, while the
active management and containment of markets dominated policy on
the ground. For example, initially, the ICC, an agency that engaged in
active economic policy-setting,253 wanted to allow rate agreements in
various industries, while the Justice Department wanted to prosecute

249. Appalachian Coals v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933).
250. HYLTON, supra note 13, at 108.
251. Appalachian Coals, 288 U.S. at 361–64.
252. In fact, the Court noted the “destructive” labor market effects of ruinous competition in
the bituminous coal market absent the agreement between the producers, as one of its
justifications for allowing the agreement. Id. at 364 (“[W]ages to labor have been substantially
lessened.”). The point I am making here is that the reasoning of Appalachian Coals can apply
directly to labor markets, in addition to sometimes justifying price-fixing in an adjacent
commodity market.
253. See BELZER, supra note 33, at 55 (discussing the ICC).
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them under the Sherman Act.254 The Reed-Bulwinkle Act, enacted in
1948,255 ended this standoff by legalizing rate agreements among
railroads and motor carriers as long as they were approved by the
ICC.256 These industries were early strongholds of organized labor, and
this compromise represented the temporary triumph of the tripartite
economic governance of markets previously mentioned. De facto rate
setting, with a significant role for organized labor, in product markets
characterized other key industries as well.257
Eventually, of course, this tripartite model of economic governance
was dismantled, with the “deregulation” policy that began in the 1970s,
culminating in the actual dismantling of the ICC. What Michael Belzer
has called “deregulation policy” really consisted of changing the state’s
role in economic governance, reducing its ability to directly engage in
economic policy setting in the general interest,258 leaving it to other
means (including directly regulating workers and imposing personal
penalties), often to compensate for problems caused by rampant
competition, the removal of any role for labor in economic governance,
and the decimation of labor standards.259 For example, in trucking, the
state role in the mid-century era was characterized by the ICC’s rate
setting and other direct engagement in economic policy. These
essentially ensured a lack of undercutting among both firms and drivers,
with the result that public safety was not a major problem.260 After

254. HYLTON, supra note 13, at 97–98.
255. Reed-Bulwinkle Act of 1948, ch. 491, 62 Stat. 472 (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C.
§ 10706 (2012)).
256. See HYLTON, supra note 13, at 98 (discussing the Reed-Bulwinkle Act); see also Belzer,
supra note 33, at 59–61 (discussing the Reed-Bulwinkle Act).
257. See, e.g., THOMAS GEOGHEGAN, Before the Lean Years, in WHICH SIDE ARE YOU ON?
TRYING TO BE FOR LABOR WHEN IT’S FLAT ON ITS BACK 40, 40–58 (2004) (recounting the
United Mine Workers’ critical role in coordinating the coal product market).
258. For example, the policy of deregulation in the American trucking industry began in 1977
when the ICC began to loosen the regulations that defined each carrier’s pricing. BELZER, supra
note 33, at 28. Some companies failed; others began the pressure on their workers to cut wages.
Id. The policy was ratified by Congress, and took root in earnest, with the Motor Carrier Act of
1980, which affirmed the earlier administrative deregulation of interstate trucking by removing
regulatory barriers to enter into the market, eliminating indirect routings, and permitting
discriminatory pricing (allowing discounts to high-volume customers). Id. For the first time
since the 1930’s, below-cost rates were legal, enabling overt undercutting. Id. In 1994, Congress
accomplished the deregulation of intrastate trucking as well, ordering states to stop regulating
local trucking by enacting the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act. Federal
Aviation Administration Authorization Act, 49 U.S.C. 14501; see BELZER, supra note 33, at 28.
259. See supra Part I.B, at notes 33–37 (describing the labor market effects of deregulation in
trucking).
260. BELZER, supra note 33, at 25.
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“deregulation,” the state’s role took the form of a net of safety
regulations governing drivers’ behavior.261 Business became the prime
actor to directly set economic policy; in the case of trucking, these
policy makers were primarily powerful economic actors in adjacent
markets, such as retailers, who were increasingly linked to the global
supply chain. Thus “deregulation policy” really consisted in a
profoundly changed, not eliminated, role of the state in economic life.
The neoclassical turn on the policy level was mirrored in the pricefixing doctrine, so that earlier cases that had extended Chicago Board of
Trade to allow various forms of cooperative behavior were largely
superseded. Socony established that lack of market power is not even a
defense to price-fixing, much less is market power an element of proof,
thus prohibiting much cooperative conduct that might otherwise have
been permitted.262 Thereafter came the rigid apex of the price-fixing
doctrine, embodied especially in Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n
and presaged in National Society of Professional Engineers, both
decisions involving small producers and both authored by Justice
Stevens.263 These decisions exemplify the post-Socony regime, which
narrowed and clarified the ruling in Chicago Board of Trade.264 A
decade and a half apart, Trial Lawyers can be seen as the natural
completion of the logic of Professional Engineers: taking the willful
blinders to relational market power, and to potential social and
economic benefits of the concerted action, to a certain principled
extreme.
However, a contemporary revival of Appalachian Coals for labor
markets is made possible by even more recent cases that seem to have
again expanded both the scope and the meaning of rule of reason
analysis.265 Thus, in our current moment “there are pressures to expand
261. Id. at 67–72.
262. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940); see also HYLTON, supra
note 13, at 109 (discussing the Socony case).
263. See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 424
(1990) (refusing to consider social justifications and reasonableness of prices, in considering
alleged price-fixing); see also Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 693–
94 (1978) (refusing to consider public safety and other quality or consumer benefits as defense to
alleged price-fixing).
264. See Socony, 310 U.S. at 211–12 (narrowing the rule of reason so that only effects strictly
tied to promoting market competition could be considered).
265. See United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 664 (3d. Cir. 1993) (allowing
consideration of quality-enhancement arguments under the rule of reason, indicating a softening
of the National Society of Professional Engineers approach); see also Broad. Music Inc. v.
Columbia Broad. Sys., 441 U.S. 1, 22–24 (1979) (allowing an exception to price-fixing for the
introduction of a new product).
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rule of reason analysis” to justifications beyond strictly promoting
market competition.266 So far, the benefits of any relaxation seem to
have flowed mostly to large market actors, with small actors mostly left
by the wayside.267 Some contemporary antitrust commentators, notably
Warren Grimes, have argued that we ought to effectively return to the
analysis of Appalachian Coals by considering relational market power
as a basis for allowing concerted action among smaller, less powerful
market actors—including, paradigmatically,
professionals (such as doctors or lawyers) who practice individually or
in small groups and must do business with power buyers of their
services; small businesses (such as independent pharmacies or
bookstore owners) . . . that confront power buyers and sellers; small
franchisees . . . ; small farmers . . . ; and any independent contractor
that sells services to a power buyer (such as a taxicab driver or a truck
owner . . .).268

The arc of the price-fixing doctrine demonstrates that it contains no
inexorable logic requiring the prohibition of collective action by
workers or other small economic actors who earn their income primarily
through labor, and in fact contains materials to build a different
approach.
2. The Professional Privilege
In addition to the pliabilities in the concept of price-fixing just
discussed, courts also sometimes invoke the status of sellers as members
of one of the traditional professions, either to justify rule of reason
rather than per se treatment, or as a consideration among others in the
application of the rule of reason. It is thus a privilege rather than an
exemption, and its reach is fairly limited, particularly under the
influence of neoclassicism—although we may see it expand under the
same pressures mentioned relating to the rule of reason. I mention it
separately from the other pliabilities described above only because of its
likely roots in very early trade regulation, and because the same
privilege is not accorded to workers or sellers who lack the social and
economic status of the professions. Like all the pliabilities, it represents
normative considerations outside neoclassical theory, but this set at
once hearkens to animating ideals of pre-market economy trade

266. HYLTON, supra note 13, at 109.
267. Grimes, supra note 12, at 221–22.
268. See id. at 196–97 (arguing antitrust should allow “countervailing power through the
collective action of small buyers or sellers”).
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regulation,269 and demonstrates the continuing thread of greater legal
privilege within economic regulation accorded to those with greater
social and economic status.
The professions have, even in the heyday of neoclassical influence,
remained at least partially staked out as a place where courts
acknowledge that market forces may not be appropriate to determine all
aspects of economic life. It is thus one more way in which the pricefixing doctrine on its own terms admits that market competition need
not, and perhaps ought not, govern all of economic life, but, then,
reserves the benefit of this restraint largely to socioeconomic elites. For
example, in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,270 although the Court
rejected the wholesale exclusion of the learned professions from
antitrust law (noting that lawyers are vital to commerce), it also treated
as obvious the idea that the professions ought to be treated differently
from other commercial actors, and perhaps with greater deference.
Seemingly limiting its holding (allowing the possibility of antitrust
liability) to the facts before it, the Court asserted:
The fact that a restraint operates upon a profession as distinguished
from a business is, of course, relevant in determining whether that
particular restraint violates the Sherman Act. It would be unrealistic
to view the practice of professions as interchangeable with other
business activities, and automatically to apply to the professions
antitrust concepts which originated in other areas. The public service
aspect, and other features of the professions, may require that a
particular practice, which could properly be viewed as a violation of
the Sherman Act in another context, be treated differently. We
intimate no view on any other situation than the one with which we
are confronted today.271

This is a very clear statement that the professions ought to be treated
differently from other producers or workers in applying the Sherman
Act, and that greater deference is due their concerted action. Yet
workers outside the professions may also have legitimate claims to a
more republican form of regulation of their economic activity.
Moreover, considerations relating to the public interest may support
those claims, both because of how poor working conditions affect
matters such as public safety, and because of the ripple economic and
social effects of poverty itself.

269. See supra Part II.A, at notes 79–84 (discussing pre-classicist trade regulation).
270. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
271. Id. at 78 n.17.
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In fact, the professional privilege reflects the resilience, even in the
face of neoclassicist ideology, of the deep-seated collective intuition
that those who are doing the material work of economic life are entitled
to a role in governing it and that indeed we all benefit when they do.
The guild economy to which the professional privilege hearkens back
was certainly organized around that supposition.272
Although the neoclassical turn in antitrust doctrine certainly limited
the professional privilege, the greater current porousness in the rule of
reason offers the possibility of its re-expansion. It is thus relevant both
as a point of contrast to the law’s treatment of other workers,
particularly low-wage workers, and as another doctrinal basis (if mostly
by analogy) for excluding worker collective action from antitrust
liability, or seriously limiting its scope.
3. First Amendment Protection for Worker Collective Action?:
“Economic” and “Political” Protest
The analysis of First Amendment protection for worker collective
action (not immunized by the labor exemption) also demonstrates how
essentially extrinsic normative considerations enter into antitrust
doctrine. In this case, an artificial distinction between the “economic”
and the “political” keeps First Amendment protection for a classic
workers’ boycott at bay.
I have previously described Trial Lawyers as an instance of the
neoclassical price-fixing logic applied to worker collective action that
looms as a serious threat, if not an outright blockade, to much
nontraditional worker organizing, particularly on the part of
independent contractor workers not affiliated with a traditional labor
organization.273 It is also a prime illustration of how courts may treat a
First Amendment defense to antitrust liability for worker collective
action. In this case, the court of appeal had reversed the trial court’s
finding of liability, reasoning that the expressive component of the
boycott was protected by the First Amendment to the extent of
nullifying the per se treatment, which would otherwise apply to a
“classic restraint of trade.” The court of appeal had imposed on the

272. See supra Part II.A, at notes 79–84 (discussing pre-classicist trade regulation).
273. In the case discussed here, the workers’ association did not try to claim softer treatment
based on their status in the professions, nor on the basis of the labor exemption (despite using
much of the language and strategy of traditional labor collective action in the actual conduct at
issue). This is not entirely surprising given the narrowness of the labor exemption as previously
described, and the neoclassical tightening of the professional privilege, which would have been at
its height.
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FTC the requirement of showing “significant market power” on the part
of the conspirators. The Supreme Court first agreed with the court of
appeal that “this constriction of supply is the essence of ‘price-fixing,’
whether it be accomplished by agreeing upon a price . . . or by agreeing
upon an output, which will increase the price offered.”274 It then
rejected both the association’s First Amendment argument based on
Claiborne Hardware, which urged that even if the conduct violated the
Sherman Act it was protected as an expressive boycott, and the court of
appeal’s First Amendment reasoning based on O’Brien, which had held
that the expressive components of the conduct warranted rule of reason
treatment (inviting a consideration of market power and reasonableness
of prices).275
In distinguishing Claiborne Hardware, the Court places “equal
respect” and “equal treatment” beyond the market, and reasoned that the
First Amendment protects concerted action, including collective
refusals to deal, as long as they are aimed at securing such “equal
respect” and “equal treatment.”276
“Equality and freedom are
preconditions of the free market, and not commodities to be haggled
over within it.”277 As if by poetic contrast, the opinion immediately
goes on: “The same cannot be said of attorney’s fees.”278 The Court
dwelled little on the material reality of the lawyers’ lives, instead
immediately going on to characterize them as “business competitors
who stand to profit financially from a lessening of competition in the
boycotted market.”279 This account essentially characterized pay for
personal labor as “financial profit,” a result that is compelling neither on
neoclassical economic theory nor on a broader view of human labor.
Remember that the conduct specifically being sanctioned here was
simply the collective refusal to work: the closest resemblance in perhaps
all the price-fixing case law to classic labor concerted action. Indeed,
that the lawyers had little else to leverage but their personal labor,
which was therefore really all they owned, is evidenced by the fact that
that is exactly what they did. Note that it was generally agreed that the
fees were reasonable and a better public policy in terms of the defense
of indigent clients provided by the lawyers.280 There is an irony in the
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.

Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 423 (1990).
Id. at 426–36 (citing NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982)).
Id. at 426.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 423.
Various court and bar committees that had been convened to study the issue, and likely
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fact that the articulation of the apex of the neoclassical logic of pricefixing—which must ultimately ground itself in the idea that markets,
defined by self-interested economic action, ought to be the basis for
organizing all economic life—would seem to moralize about relatively
low-income, low-status attorneys taking action in their economic selfinterest.281
Secondly, there is a circularity in asserting that equality to which one
is “constitutionally entitled”282 is beyond the reach of the market, in
order to answer the question to what is one constitutionally entitled. In
fact, the only way to avoid that circularity is to acknowledge that, of
course, we are actually discussing two different constitutional questions:
whether the object of the boycott is constitutionally protected (in the
case of Claiborne Hardware,283 by the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments) and whether the boycott is constitutionally protected (by
the First Amendment). Certainly, race discrimination is prohibited by
the Constitution,284 while low attorneys’ fees, and even poverty wages,
are not. But is the rule really that an expressive boycott is entitled to
First Amendment protection only if its object is constitutionally
protected? Clearly, that is not the rule. Perhaps what the Court meant
to say instead is that the object of a constitutionally protected boycott
cannot be an affirmatively illegitimate one, as defined by antitrust.
Note, though, that this too compares apples and oranges: seeking higher
attorneys’ fees (putting aside for the moment whether they should be
characterized as financial profit or pay for labor) is not, as a purpose for
action, illegal under the antitrust laws. The conduct as a whole must be
analyzed under the antitrust laws to make a determination about
legitimacy. Put aside even that issue and assume the lawyers’ conduct
did violate the Sherman Act. To rely upon that alone is simply to
eviscerate the constitutional limits on antitrust when it comes to
expressive boycotts. One can imagine, in other words, a rule that the

the political branches of the District of Columbia as well, endorsed the higher rates as a policy
matter, citing in particular the impact upon the quality of representation. Id. at 444–46.
281. It is, perhaps, the smallest whiff of the double standard that the market framework seems
to embody when plumbed deeply enough in any one place: freedom and self-interest for the
haves, morality and self-denial for the have-nots.
282. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. at 426.
283. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982).
284. This is putting aside an issue that the opinion glosses over—that the Constitution does
not literally guarantee the aims of the Claiborne Hardware boycotters, to the extent that the
underlying wrongs did not involve state action. Presumably, the Court is relying upon the
constitutional principle to distinguish between the aims of the two sets of boycotters. However,
this issue further highlights the lack of clarity around what that principle is.
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First Amendment only protects expressive boycotts that would not
otherwise be violations of the antitrust laws. Perhaps all the foregoing
complexities serve to avoid stating such a bold rule outright. We will
never really know, because the Court dispensed with the Claiborne
Hardware argument on the basis of what it painted as an extreme
contrast between the objects of the two sets of concerted action
(constitutionally hallowed on one end, illegal on the other end).
The Court also seemed to rely partially on its relatively offhand,
closing statement that Claiborne Hardware does not protect economic
boycotts, distinguishing those from the “peaceful, political activity”
involved in the earlier case.285 But this distinction is not tenable.
Boycotts by definition involve an economic act: the collective refusal to
buy or sell, in an attempt to influence some specific behavior of the one
from whom one has been buying or selling. The two cases are not
distinguishable in any salient respect as to their employment of this
means. The other points of comparison are the objects of the means
employed, and any other means used. As for the latter, the Court
conceded that the lawyers engaged in various expressive activity that
was political in nature. In the lawyers’ case, the Court separated this
conduct from the economic boycott;286 yet, in the civil rights
boycotters’ case, the Court ran this conduct together with the concerted
refusal to buy.287 As for the purposes of the boycotts, the rule would
then have to be that boycotts aimed at bringing economic benefits to the
boycotters288 are not entitled to First Amendment protection. Surely
this cannot be the rule, since many of the benefits sought by the
boycotters in Claiborne Hardware were also economic in nature. To be
sure, those economic benefits were grounded in a claim for racial
justice, but if that (or some other constitutionally protected value) is the
requirement, then we are back at the circular argument just described.
The Trial Lawyers Court then turned to the court of appeal’s
reasoning that even if not protected wholesale, the lawyers’ conduct was
entitled to a softened rule of reason treatment due to the First
Amendment implications.289 The Court rejected this partially on the

285. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. at 428.
286. See, e.g., id. at 431 (“[T]his level of expression is not an element of the boycott.”).
287. Id. at 428.
288. Emphasizing its economic aspects, the Court calls what the lawyers sought variously
“attorneys fees,” “special advantage,” “economic[] advantage,” “[financial] profit.” Id. at 427–
28. The idea of “special advantage,” again, implies a counterfactual embedded with normative
assumptions. Id.
289. Id. at 429.
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basis of the same distinction between the economic and the political that
it mentioned in its rejection of the Claiborne Hardware argument, but
also on the basis of an analysis of the role of market power in pricefixing analysis.290 The former, as just described, is based upon an
artificial and selective separation of the expressive and the economic
components of the concerted action, which in turn points up the
artificiality of the distinction in the first place. The latter is based on a
perhaps exaggerated solidity of the “rule of law” that the lawyers
supposedly violated.291
Even most theorists who assume that antitrust should strictly
implement economic theory would say that refusing to consider market
power is not the best implementation of what that theory would
prescribe.292 The Court skirted this conclusion. It certainly relied upon
what it characterized as the massive administrative inconvenience of
analyzing market power. At the same time, it insisted that “the per se
rules also reflect a longstanding judgment that the prohibited practices
by their nature have ‘a substantial potential for impact on
competition.’”293 The analogy chosen was an odd one:
The per se rules in antitrust law serve purposes analogous to per se
restrictions upon, for example, stunt flying in congested areas or
speeding . . . . Perhaps most violations of such rules actually cause no
harm. No doubt many experienced drivers and pilots can operate
much more safely, even at prohibited speeds, than the average citizen.
. . . Yet the laws may nonetheless be enforced against these skilled
persons without proof that their conduct was actually harmful or
dangerous.294

290. Id. at 430–36.
291. These points are also made in Justice Brennan’s dissent, which endorses the court of
appeal’s application of the rule of reason, because that is appropriate in cases of expressive
boycotts that have both First Amendment and antitrust implications. Id. at 437–52 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). The dissent reasons that the per se rule is a presumption (almost by definition, some
practices banned by it would pass the rule of reason), and that in a First Amendment case, the
government cannot apply broad presumptions (that certain categories of speech are harmful)
without engaging in a more particularized examination. Id. The dissent emphasizes the history
of boycotts, and adduces facts specific to this boycott in particular, that show it or them to be in
essence a political, rather than or in addition to an economic, tactic to change behavior. Id. It
emphasizes that the expressive component of an expressive boycott is inseparable from the
boycott activity, rejecting the compartmentalization of the majority’s analysis (and rejecting the
idea that the minimal expression inherent in every boycott is what makes it fall in the expressive
category). Id.
292. See, e.g., HYLTON, supra note 13, at 114 (suggesting that market power should be
considered in analyzing antitrust violations).
293. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. at 433 (majority opinion).
294. Id.
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But the point is that a group of competitors with insufficient market
power don’t pose a risk at all, not that the risk is potential but not actual,
as it is with obviously and inherently dangerous activity (stunt flying in
traffic). It is fairly evident that the lawyers lacked such “relational”
market power: the market was characterized by a single large, organized
buyer. The same idea—monopsony—motivated Appalachian Coals but
had since been largely abandoned by the courts. The results of this
imbalance of market power were depressed rates of pay that no one on
the ground seriously thought were fair, sustainable, or good policy.
As the deregulation era marches ever forward, bringing with it the
continued growth of nontraditional work, the rigidities and tensions of
the approach to worker collective action embodied in Trial Lawyers are
likely to become more dramatically exposed. If so, we will also be
presented with the opportunity to consider that approach afresh.
CONCLUSION
My aim here has been to trace the history of an idea: the application
of antitrust liability to worker collective action. The situation of today’s
independent contractor workers, who face antitrust liability for engaging
in collective action aimed at improving wages and working conditions,
starkly confronts us with this issue, and with the deeper questions about
the relationship between market regulation and labor regulation that it
raises.
The suggestion that I have tried to make is simply that we should
reevaluate this rule, and that in doing so, we ought to engage in a truly
new examination of the values implicated, freed from the default
assumptions—largely accidents of history—that have mostly dogged
discussions of the matter. Such an examination may include, to be sure,
costs that might result from very strong labor combinations in certain
markets. But it also must include the benefits that would result from
recognizing and honoring the expression of human agency that worker
collective action is, as well as the social, economic, and moral value of
decent working conditions and decent wages for work.
Nothing in the core logic of modern antitrust law constrains courts or
legislatures from such a reconsideration; in fact, the peculiar history of
the default rule examined in this Article demands it. In future work, I
will further explore the republican origins of the Sherman Act itself as a
potential source for developing a set of considerations that might
replace the default rule. To clear the space for that work, I hope to have
shown that the apparent logical inevitability of the status quo, which
would bring the heavy hammer of the Sherman Act down on worker
collective action almost without exception, is illusory.

